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WEST GERMAN ABORTION DECISION:
A CONTRAST TO ROE v. WADEt
Translated by ROBERT E. JONAS*
AND JOHN D. GORBY**

Guiding Principles
applicable to the judgment of the First Senate of the 25th of
February, 1975:
-

1 F.C.C. 1/74

-

1 F.C.C.
1 F.C.C.
1 F.C.C.
1 F.C.C.
1 F.C.C.

-

2/74 3/74 4/74 5/74 6/74 --A

1. The life which is developing itself in the womb of the
mother is an independent legal value which enjoys the protection of the constitution (Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1;
Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law).
The State's duty to protect forbids not only direct state
attacks against life developing itself, but also requires the state
to protect and foster this life.
2. The obligation of the state to protect the life developing
itself exists, even against the mother.
3. The protection of life of the child en ventre sa mereB
takes precedence as a matter of principle for the entire duration
of the pregnancy over the right of the pregnant woman to selfdetermination and may not be placed in question for any particular time.
t [Hereinafter cited as Translation]. Due to certain differences of
opinion between the two translators, it is suggested that the reader refer
to both the Remarks by Robert Jonas, and the Introduction by John
Gorby.-Editors.
B.A., St. Louis University (1965); J.D., Notre Dame (1970). Member of the Illinois Bar.
** Associate Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School: B.A.,
Knox College (1961); J.D., University of Michigan (1968). Mr. Gorby
s pent two and one-half years on a German Exchange Fellowship at the
niversity of Heidelberg (DAAD), during which time he also held a
stipend at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign Public and International
Law.
A. See pp. 567-68 of the Introduction. Note: translator footnotes
will be indicated by letters; footnotes of the German Constitutional
Court will be indicated by Arabic numerals; parenthetical remarks
within the text of the translation are those of the German Constitutional
Court.
B. See p. 554 of the Preface.
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4. The legislature may express the legal condemnation of
the interruption of pregnancy required by the Basic Law through
measures other than the threat of punishment. The decisive
factor is whether the totality of the measures serving the protection of the unborn life guarantees an actual protection which in
fact corresponds to the importance of the legal value to be
guaranteed. In the extreme case, if the protection required by
the constitution cannot be realized in any other manner, the
legislature is obligated to employ the criminal law to secure the
life developing itself.
5. A continuation of the pregnancy is not to be exactedc
(legally) if the termination is necessary to avert from the pregnant woman a danger to her life or the danger of a serious
impairment of her health. Beyond that the legislature is at liberty to designate as non-exactable other extraordinary burdens
for the pregnant woman, which are of similar gravity and, in
these cases, to leave the interruption of pregnancy free of punishment.
6. The Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law of the 18th
of June, 1974, (Federal Law Reporter I, p. 1297) has not in the
required extent done justice to the constitutional obligation to
protect prenatal life.
The Federal Constitutional Court
-

1
1
1
1
1
1

F.C.C.
F.C.C.
F.C.C.
F.C.C.
F.C.C.
F.C.C.

1/74
2/74
3/74
4/74
5/74
6/74

-

announces a decision
on the 25th of February 1975,
Hempel,
being the chief secretary of the government
acting as clerk of the court,
IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE
In the proceeding
for constitutional examination of the Fifth Statute to Reform
C. See pp. 586 et seq. of the Introduction and pp. 595-96 of the

Remarks.
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the Penal Law (Fifth Penal Law Reform Statute) of the 18th
of June 1974 (Federal Law Reporter I, p. 1297),
the Petitioners being:
I.

193 members of the German Federal Parliament

Prof. Dr. Manfred Abelein,
Odal von Alten-Nordheim,
Dr. Walter Althammer,
Dr. Gottfried Arnold,
Dr. Helmut Artzinger,
Dr. Walter Becher
(Pullach),
Dr. Curt Becker
(M6nchengladbach),
Ursula Benedix,
Gerold Benz,
Ulrich Berger,
Karl Bewerunge,
Herman Biechele,
Alfred Biehle,
Dr. Philipp von Bismark,
Dr. Norbert Bluim,
Helmut von Bockelberg,
Wilfried Bbhm (Melsungen),
Gerhard Braun,
Ferdinand Breidbach,
Rolf Bremer,
Klaus Bremm,
Prof. Dr. Fritz Burgbacher,
Albert Burger,
Manfred Carstens (Emstek),
Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens
(Fehmarn),
Dr. Herbert Czaja,
Carl Damm,
Rembert van Delden,
Dr. Werner Dollinger,
Nicolaus Dreyer,
Karl Eigen,
Jan Eilers (Wilhelmshaven),
Matthias Engelsberger,
Benno Erhard (Bad
Schwalbach),
Leo Ernesti,
Richard Ey,
Dr. Heinz Eyrich,
Otto Freiherr van Fircks,
Heinrich Franke
(Osnabriick),
Dr. Ludwig Franz,
Dr. Friedrich Freiwald,
Dr. Goke D. Frerichs,
Dr. Isidor Friih,
Dr. Karl Fuchs,
Franz Xaver Geisenhofer,
Paul Gerlach (Obernau),
Johannes Gerster (Mainz),
Karl Heinz Gierenstein,
Dr. Georg G6lter,
Dr. Hermann Gdtz,
Dr. Herbert Gruhl,
Dr. Hansjbrg Hlfele,
Kurt Hhrzschel,
Dr. Hugo Hammans,
Franz Handlos,

56. Alo Hauser (Bonn-Bad
Godesberg)
57. Hansheinz Hlauser (Krefeld),
58. Dr. Hugo Hauser (Sasbach),
59. Dr. Bruno Heck,
60. Hermann H6cherl,
61. Alex H6sl,
62. Dr. Karl Heinz Hornhues,
63. Martin Horstmeier,
64. Agnes Hiirland,
65. Dr. Herbert Hupka,
66. Dieter Hussing,
67. Dr. Richard Jaeger,
68. Dr. Friedrich-Adolf Jahn
(Miinster),
69. Dr. Philipp Jenninger,
70. Dr. Dionys Jobst,
71. Johann Peter Josten,
72. Hans Katzer,
73. Dr. Friedrich Kempfler,
74. Ignaz Kiechle,
75. Walther Leisler Kiep,
76. Dr. h. c. Kurt Georg
Kiesinger,
77. Dr. Josef Klein (Stolberg),
78. Prof Dr. Hans Hugo Klein
(G6ttingen),
79. Dr. Georg Kiesing,
80. Dr. Herbert W. Kbhler
(Duisburg),
81. Dr. Volkmar Kbhler
(Wolfsburg),
82. Gottfried K6ster,
83. Wilhelm Krampe,
84. Dr. Konrad Kraske,
85. Hermann Kroll-Schliiter,
86. Gerhard Kunz (Berlin),
87. Dr. Max Kunz (Weiden),
88. Karl-Hans Lagershausen,
89. Egon Lampersbach,
90. Albert Leicht,
91. Dr. Carl Otto Lenz
(Bergstrasse),
92. Christian Lenzer,
93. Helmut Link,
94. Paul Liher,
95. Dr. Manfred Luda,
96. Dr. Werner Marx,
97. Eugen Maucher,
98. Dr. Alois Mertes
(Gerolstein),
99. Josef Mick,
100. Prof. Dr. Paul Mikat,
101. Dr. Karl Miltner,
102. Peter Milz,
103. Heiner M6ller (Lilbeck),
104. Adolf Miuller (Remscheid),
105. Johannes Miller (Berlin),
106. Dr. Ernst Miiller-Hermann,
107. Dr. Karl-Heinz Narjes,
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108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Dr. Hanna Neumeister,
Lorenz Niegel,
Franz-Josef Nordlohne,
Dr.-Ing. Martin Oldenstldt,
Gerhard Orgass,
Doris Pack,
Gerhard 0. Pfeffermann,
Anton Pfeifer,
Walter Picard,
Elmar Pieroth,
Liselotte Pieser,
Eberhard Pohlmann,
Dr. Helmut Prassler,
Dr. Albert Probst,
Wilhelm Rawe,
Gerhard Reddemann,
Dr. Paula Riede
(Oeffingen),
Dr. Erich Riedl (Munchen),
Dr. Gerd Ritgen,
Dr. Burkhard Ritz,
Paul Rohner,
Josef Rommerskirchen,
Hans Roser,
Hermann Josef Russe,
Helmut Sauer (Salzgitter),
Franz Sauter (Epfendorf),
Botho Prinz zu SaynWittgenstein-Hohenstein,
Dr. Wolfgang Schauble,
Albert Schedl,
Ursula Schleicher,
Peter M. Schmidhuber,
Josef Schmitt (Lockweiler),
Hans-Peter Schmitz
(Baesweiler),
Dr. Oscar Schneider,
Christa Schroeder
(Detmold),
Dr. Gerhard Schrdder
(Diisseldorf),
Horst Schroder (Liineburg),
Dieter Schulte
(Schwdbisch Gmiind),
Dr. Max Schulze-Vorberg,
Rudolf Seiters,
Emil Solke
Dr. Adolf Freiherr Spies
von Buillesheim,
Karl-Heinz Spilker,
-authorized representatives:

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Carl-Dieter Spranger,
Gerd Springorum,
Dr. Rudolf Sprung,
Dr. Anton Stark
(Niirtingen),
Franz Ludwig Schenk
Graf von Stauffenberg,
Dr. Lutz G. Stavenhagen,
Maria Stommel,
Richard Stiucklen,
Egon Susset,
Hans-Adolf de Terra,
Kurt Thiirk,
Ferdinand Tillmann,
Dr. Jiirgen Gerhard
Todenhbfer,
Irma Tiibler,
Dr. Hermann Josef Unland,
Max Vehar,
Roswitha Verhiilsdonk,
Friedrich Vogel (Ennepetal),
Wolfgang Vogt,
Giinter Volmer,
Dr. Horst Waffenschmidt,
Dr. h.c. Leo Wagner
(Giinzburg),
Dr. Carl-Ludwig Wagner
(Trier),
Dr. Theodor Waigel,
Dr. Walter Wallmann,
Kurt Wawrzik,
Karl Weber (Heidelberg),
Dr. Richard Freiherr
von Weizsicker,
Herbert Werner,
Dr. Helga Wex
Waltrud Will-Feld.
Heinrich Windelen,
Hans Wissebach,
Dr. Manfred Worner,
Olaf Baron von Wrangel,
Dr. Otto Wulff,
Prof. Dr. Gerhard Zeitel,
Werner Zeyer,
Erich Ziegler,
Dr. Friedrich Zimmermann,
Otto Zink,
Siegfried Zoglmann,
Kai-Uwe von Hassel

a) attorney Benno Erhard, MP,
Bonn, Federal Building,
b) Prof. Dr. Peter Lerche,
Gauting, Junkersstrasse 13-

- 1 F.C.C. 1/74 State of Baden-Wuirttemberg represented by
of
the
government
II. The
the Minister of Justice, Stuttgart, Schillerplatz 4
a) Prof. Dr. Fritz Ossenbuihl,
-authorized representatives:
Meckenheim, Bergstrasse 15,
b) Prof. Dr. Hans-Joachim
Rudolphi, Bonn-Lengsdorf,
Am Kiferberg 5- 1 F.C.C. 2/74 III. The government of the Saarland represented by the Prime Minister,
Saarbriucken, Ludwigsplatz 14-
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a) Prof. Dr. Fritz Ossenbihl,
Meckenheim, Bergstrasse 15,
b) Prof. Dr. Hans-Joachim
Rudolphi, Bonn-Lengsdorf,
Am Kaferberg 5-1 F.C.C. 3/74 The government of the Free State of Bavaria represented by the
Prime Minister, Munich 22 Prinzregentenstrasse 7
Director of the Ministry Prof. Dr.
-authorized representative:
Walter Odersky, Munich, Elisenstrasse la- 1 F.C.C. 4/74 -- authorized representatives:

IV.

V.

The government of the State of Schleswig-Holstein, represented by
the Prime Minister, Kiel, State Capital
- 1 F.C.C. 5/74 -

VI.

The government of the State of Rhineland-Pfalz, represented by the
Minister of Justice, Mainz, Ernst-Ludwig-Strasse 3
1 F.C.C. 6/74 -

the Federal Constitutional Court - First Senate President of the Court Dr. Benda, presiding,
Ritterspach,
and Justices
Dr. Haager,
Rupp von Briinneck,
Dr. B6hmer,
Dr. Faller,
Dr. Brox,
Dr. Simon, participating,
on the basis of the oral argument of the 18th and 19th of
November 1974, recognizes as law by this opinion:

HOLDING
I. Section 218a of the Penal Code in the version of the Fifth
Statute to Reform the Penal Law (5 PLRS) of June 18, 1974,
(Federal Law Reporter I, p. 1297) is incompatible with
Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, in conjunction with
Article 1, Paragraph 1, of the Basic Law and is null insofar

as it excepts the interruption of pregnancy from criminal
liability when no reasons are present which, in the sense of
the reasons for this decision, have validity in the ordering
of values of the Basic Law.
II. Until a new statutory regulation goes into effect the following is ordered under the authority of §35 of the Statute of
the Constitutional Court:
1. §218b and §219 of the Penal Code in the version of the
Fifth Statute for the Reform of the Penal Law (5 PLRS)
of June 18, 1974 (Federal Law Reporter I, p. 1297) are
to be applied to interruptions of pregnancy during the
first twelve weeks after conception.
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2.

An abortion performed by a physician with the consent
of the pregnant woman within the first twelve weeks
after conception is not punishable under §218 of the
Penal Code if an illegal act pursuant to §§176-179 of the
Penal Code has been committed against the pregnant
woman, and compelling reasons demand the assumption
that the pregnancy is a result of the act.

3.

If the interruption of the pregnancy is performed by a
physician within the first twelve weeks after conception
with the consent of the pregnant woman to avert from
the pregnant woman danger of a serious calamity which
cannot be averted in any other way which is exactable
from her, the court may forgo a punishment under §218.
Reasoning: D
A.

The subject matter of the proceeding is the question whether
the so-called regulation of terms of the Fifth Statute to Reform
the Penal Law according to which termination of pregnancy
remains free of punishment during the first twelve weeks after
conception under certain conditions is consistent with the Basic
Law.
1. The Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law (5 PLRS)
of June 18, 1974 (Federal Law Reporter I, p. 1297) has regulated
punishability of the interruption of pregnancy in a new manner.
Sections 218 to 220 have been replaced by provisions which visa-vis the previous state of the law contain primarily the following alterations:
As a matter of principle, anyone who interrupts a pregnancy
more than 13 days after conception shall be punished (§218, Par.
1). An abortion performed by a physician, however, with the
consent of the pregnant woman is not punishable under §218 if
not more than twelve weeks have elapsed since conception
(§218a-Regulation of Terms.). Furthermore, an interruption of
pregnancy performed by a physician with the consent of the
pregnant woman after the expiration of the twelve week period
is not punishable under §218 if the abortion is indicated, according to the judgment of medical science, to avert from the pregnant woman either a danger to her life or the danger of a serious
impairment of the condition of her health to the extent that these
dangers cannot be averted in a fashion which is otherwise exactable (§218b, No. 1-Medical Indication).E Furthermore, abortion
D. See pp. 574 et seq. of the Introduction.
E. See note 3 of the Introduction.
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is not punishable if compelling reasons demand the assumption
that the child, because of an hereditary disposition or harmful
influences before birth, will suffer impairment to its health
which cannot be alleviated and which are so weighty that the
continuation of the pregnancy cannot be demanded of the pregnant woman, and not more than 22 weeks have elapsed since
conception (§218b, No. 2 - Eugenical Indication). Anyone who
interrupts a pregnancy without the pregnant woman first having
received social and medical counseling at a counseling center or
from a physician shall be punished (§218c). Even so an individual makes himself liable to punishment if he interrupts a pregnancy after the expiration of twelve weeks from conception
without a competent counseling center having previously certified that the prerequisites of §218b (Medical or Eugenic Indications) have met (§219). The pregnant woman herself shall not
be punished either under §218 or under §219.
In particular, the provisions which are essential for the
present proceeding provide as follows:

§218
Interruption of Pregnancy
(1) Anyone who interrupts a pregnancy after the 13th day
following conception shall be punished by incarceration up to
three years or fined.
(2) The punishment shall be six months to five years if
the actor
1. acts against the will of the pregnant woman, or,
2. wantonly causes the danger of death or serious impairment
of health to the pregnant woman.
The court can set up a supervision authority. (§68, Par. 1, No.
2).
(3) If the pregnant woman commits the act, the punishment is incarceration up to one year or a fine.
(4) The attempt is punishable. The woman shall not be
punished for an attempt.
§218a
Freedom from Punishment for Interruption
of Pregnancy in the First Twelve Weeks
An interruption of pregnancy performed by a physician with
the consent of the pregnant woman is not punishable under
§ 218 if no more than twelve weeks have elapsed since conception.
§218b
Indications for Interruption of
Pregnancy After Twelve Weeks
An interruption of pregnancy performed by a physician with
the consent of the pregnant woman after the expiration of twelve
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weeks after conception is not punishable under §218 if, according to the judgment of medical science:
1. The interruption of pregnancy is indicated in order to avert
from the pregnant woman a danger to her life or the danger
of a serious impairment to the condition of her health insofar
as the danger cannot be averted in a manner that is otherwise exactable (reasonably expected) from her, or
2. Compelling reasons require the assumption that the child will
suffer from an impairment of its health which cannot be
remedied on account of an hereditary disposition or injurious
prenatal influences which is so serious that a continuation
of the pregnancy cannot be exacted (reasonably expected) of
the pregnant woman; and not more than 22 weeks have
elapsed since conception.
§218c
Interruption of Pregnancy Without Instruction
and Counseling of the Pregnant Woman
(1) He who interrupts a pregnancy without the pregnant
woman:

1. first having, on account of the question of the interruption
of her pregnancy, presented herself to a physician or to a
counseling center empowered for the purpose and there been
instructed about the public and private assistance available
for the pregnant women, mothers and children, especially
such assistance which facilitates the continuation of the pregnancy and eases the condition of mother and child, and
2. having been counseled by a physician,
shall be punished up to one year incarceration or by a fine if
the act is not punishable under §218.
(2) The woman upon whom the operation is performed is
not subject to punishment under Paragraph one.
§219
Interruption of Pregnancy
Without Expert Opinion
(1) Anyone who interrupts a pregnancy after the expiration of twelve weeks after conception without a competent
counseling center having confirmed that the prerequisites of
§218b No. 1 or No. 2 are satisfied, shall be punished with
incarceration up to one year or by fine if the act is not punishable
under §218.
(2) The woman upon whom the operation is performed is
not subject to punishment under Paragraph one.
2. According to previous law the killing of a child in the
womb of its mother was generally a punishable act (§218 of the
Penal Code). To be sure, at latest since the decision of March
11, 1927, of the Reich's Court (Penal Law Decision of the Reich's
Court 61, 242) the justifying reason, in the case of the so-called
medical indication, of an extra-legal emergency according to the
principles of a balancing of underlying values and corresponding
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duties was recognized by legal opinions. After that the act lost
its illegality in the case of a serious danger to the life or health
of the pregnant woman which could not be averted by other
means to the extent the operation was undertaken by a physician
with the consent of the pregnant woman according to the standards of the medical art. By Paragraph 14 of the Statute for the
Prevention of Hereditarily Ill Offspring in the edition of the
amendatory law of June 26, 1935, (Reich's Reporter of Law I,
p. 773) these prerequisites for the terminations of pregnancy permissible on medical grounds were legally established. This provision was valid in some states of the Federal Republic even after
1945; where it was repealed, the prerequisites quoted therein,
pursuant to the decision of the Federal Court of January 15, 1952
(Penal Law Decisions of the Federal Court of Justice 2, 111),
were to be considered as the minimum requirements for the permissability of the interruption of pregnancy according to the
principles of supra-legal emergency.
3. The penal provision of §218 derives its essential meaning
from §§181 and 182 of the Penal Code for the Prussian states
of April 14, 1851 (Collection of Statutes, p. 101) because these
provisions served as a model for the regulation, in the Penal Code
of the North German League of May 31, 1870 (Federal Law
Reporter of the North German League, p. 197), which were incorporated word for word in the Penal Code for the German Reich
of May 15, 1871 (Reich's Reporter of Law, p. 127). The provision read in its original version as follows:
§218
A pregnant woman who intentionally aborts her fetus or kills
it in her womb shall be punished with up to five years in the
penitentiary.
If extenuating circumstances are present, an incarceration
for not less than six months will result.
The same penal provisions have application to anyone who,
with the consent of the pregnant woman, applies the means for
the abortion or killing or supplies them to her.
The penal provision remained unchanged for more than 50
years. The Statute for the Revision of the Criminal Code of May
18, 1926, (Reich's Reporter of Law I, p. 239) first mitigated the
sanctions (in principle incarceration, however, penitentiary imprisonment for the professional abortionist).
Under the Order for the Realization of the Decree for the
Defense of Marriage, Family and Motherhood of March 18, 1943
(Reich's Reporter of Law I, p. 169), the penal sanctions were once
again considerably increased.
The First Statute for the Reform of the Penal Law (1 PLRS)
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of June 25, 1969, (Federal Law Reporter I, p. 645) mitigated the
penalty in the case of the self-administered abortion in which
the especially difficult case was present. An abortion by a
professional was reduced to a misdemeanor.
4. a) The general proscription of abortion was an object
of attack from the beginning. Especially after the turn of the
century a lively discussion began within the field of legal science
about the wisdom of punishing abortion. Doubts were already
setting in about the question of which legal values should be
protected by the prohibition of abortion. The allowance of
exceptions from the unlimited prohibition and the proper assessment of the penalties to be applied were also discussed.
The original draft for a German Penal Code published in
1909 by the Ministry of Justice of the Reich; the counterproposal
of 1911 by Professors Kahl, von Lilienthal, Franz v. Liszt and
Goldschmidt; the draft based on the conclusions of -the Commission of Penal Law of 1913; and, the Draft of 1919 proposed
merely to lessen the penalty. In the reasoning for the Draft of
1919, freedom from punishment for interruption of pregnancy
was rejected "in view of the serious harm to the public good
which results from the spread of abortion."
b) During the Weimar Republic, within the scope of the
efforts to bring about a sweeping reform of the penal lawalthough such efforts came to no conclusion-§218 was once again
the object of a lively discussion. A large number of bills and
proposals for the reform of this penal provision were introduced
into the parliament. Some of them pursued the goal of eliminating §§218 to 220 without replacement. Others suggested removal
of the criminal penalty for the first three months of pregnancy.
A proposal .which Mrs. Schuch, Prof. Radbruch and 53 other
members of the Social Democrat Party introduced into the
Reichstag on July 31, 1920, provided for freedom from punishment
for abortion "if the abortion is performed by the pregnant
woman or by a physician recognized (approved) by the state, during the first three months of pregnancy" (also cf. Radbruch's
reasoning in Grotjahn-Radbruch, "The Abortion of the Child en
ventre sa mere," 1921). None of the applications was ultimately
successful.
The draft of a General German Penal Code, which Radbruch
proposed in 1922 when he was the Reich's Minister of Justice
and which became the foundation for further work on the reform
of the penal law, proposed imprisonment for abortion (cf. "Gustav Radbruch's Draft for a General German Penal Code (1922),"
Tuibingen 1952, p. 28, Section 225). The Drafts of 1925, 1927 and
1930 proposed similar regulations.
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c) During the National Socialistic period abortion was
seen principally from the points of view of the "defense of the
people's strength," "attacks on the vital energy of the people," and
"attacks on race and heredity." The goal of these endeavors,
with the exception of several indicated cases which were to
remain without punishment, was to increase punishment severely
(cf. also §10a of the Statute for the Prevention of Hereditarily
Ill Offspring).
5. As a provisional result of the work of reform on the
penal code which was resumed after 1945, the Federal Ministry
of Justice in the year 1960 drew up a comprehensive draft
together with reasoning on the basis of the conclusions of the
Great Criminal Law Commission. The draft made use of the
recommendations of a commission of the states (Draft of a Penal
Code-Draft 1960-with Reasoning, Bonn 1960).
Thereafter abortion remained punishable as a matter of
principle (§§140, 141); in the case of a medical indication, however, freedom from punishment was allowed (§157). Further,
according to §160 the penalty would be disregarded in the case
of a killing of the child en ventre sa mere undertaken by a physician with the consent of the pregnant woman if the court has
determined that someone has committed rape against the woman
or an indecent assault while she was mentally ill, without will
to resist, unconscious, or physically incapable of resistance; or
she is carrying sperm from a man other than her husband without her consent and compelling reasons demand the assumption
that the pregnancy is a result of the act, provided that not more
than twelve weeks have elapsed from the end of the month in
which the inception of the pregnancy occurs.
This ethical indication was, however, not contained in the
version of the draft of 1960 proposed by the Federal Government
to the lawmaking bodies (cf. Federal Press, 270/60, p. 38 and p.
278). This draft did not come up for consideration in the third
election period.
In the year 1962 a new governmental draft was submitted
to the lawmaking bodies, which adopted §§140, 141, 157 of the
Draft of 1960 in an essentially unchanged form (cf. Federal Press,
200/62, p. 35/36, 38). Even this draft could not be ratified in the
fourth election period of the Federal Parliament.
In November 1965 the Draft of 1962 was introduced as the
draft of a private bill by a group of members to Federal Parliament (Federal Parliamentary Press, V/32). The Federal Parliament referred the draft to the Special Committee for the Reform
of the Penal Law, which, basing its conclusions upon the so-called
Alternative Draft of a Criminal Code (General Part) published
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in 1966 by German and Swiss criminal law scholars, submitted
two partial drafts for the reform of the penal law which were
enacted in 1969 as the First and Second Statute for the Reform
of the Penal Code. By virtue of the first statute the penalties
of §218 of the Penal Code were placed within the milder framework of punishment already mentioned. In the deliberations in
the Special Committee on Penal Law there was unanimous agreement that the problematic presented by §218 was not resolved
with the adjustment of the measure of punishment but rather
that a comprehensive reform of this area must follow (cf. the
statements of Deputy Dr. Mijller-Emmert, Fifth Election Period,
144th session of the Special Committee for the Reform of the
Penal Law, Stenographic Reports, p. 3195).
The Special Part of the Alternative Draft published in 1970
was based on this idea (Alternative Draft, Special Part, Criminal Acts against the Person, First half volume, Tfibingen
1970, p. 25 ff.). Interruptions of pregnancy were-so it was represented-almost without exception forbidden and punishable.
The social reality, however, was so far removed from these legal
norms that the penalties could hardly exercise any effect.
According to this view, this would be in large measure injurious
and insufficient since the destruction of developing life is, apart
from exceptional situations, not only ethically reprehensible but
also represents the destruction of an intrinsic legal value. The
authors could not, however, agree about legislative measures
with which an effective protection of developing life could be
achieved.
The majority decided to leave the interruption of pregnancy
free from punishment during the first three months of pregnancy;
and, indeed absolutely so within four weeks after conception;
and in the second and third month on the condition that -the
interruption is performed by a physician after the pregnant
woman has sought out a counseling center (§105, Alternative
Draft). The following considerations were presented on this
point:
The fundamental conception of this suggestion is that the
decision of a woman to interrupt her pregnancy and the realization of the decision can only be effectively countered by guaranteeing to the pregnant woman, within the boundaries of the
possible, help for the alleviation of the material, social and
familial difficulties which drive her to abortion and by enabling
her to make a considered and responsible decision through a personal consultation and frank discussion. The institution of the
counseling centers should serve this purpose...
The counseling centers should, therefore, possess the capability to provide financial, social and familial assistance. Further-
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more, they should provide spiritual care for the pregnant woman
and her relatives through suitable associates and thereby make
it quite clear to those involved that the interruption of pregnancy, from the medical standpoint as well, is no trifling matter
but rather a serious operation having, under certain circumstances, momentous consequences and that the interruption itself,
even for the most pressing motives, represents the destruction
of developing life and therefore interferes with and violates a
high ethical responsibility. (loc. cit., p. 27).
The woman inclined to abortion, according to this view,
should be able to make use of the counseling center without having to fear that the realization of her intention will thereby be
rendered legally impossible. An interruption of pregnancy performed later than three months after conception should remain
free of punishment only if medical or eugenical indications are
present, in which case the prerequisites of such indication are
to be determined at a medical speciality center (§106, Alternative
Draft).
The minority did not see in this suggestion any effective
protection of developing life, but at most an indirect protection,
a protection that would be abandoned in all cases in which the
pregnant woman could not be convinced at the counseling center.
For this reason, the representatives of this opinion, as a matter
of principle, adhered to the punishability of the interruption of
pregnancy with the exception of the first four weeks. They proposed freedom from punishment, however, "if carrying the pregnancy to term was not exactable from the pregnant woman upon
consideration of the total circumstances of her life," and made
this general clause concrete with a catalog of five indications.
A further prerequisite for freedom from punishment should be
the consent of the pregnant woman as well as the approval of
a medical speciality center and that the interruption be performed in the first three months after conception.
6. At the beginning of 1972 the Federal Government submitted the draft of a Fifth Statute for the Reform of the Penal
Law (5 PLRS) (Federal Press, 58/72). The draft adhered to the
fundamental punishability of the interruption of pregnancy. In
the reasoning it was explained that human life even before birth
is a legal value which is worthy of protection and which requires
protection. The Basic Law, in Article 1 and Article 2, Paragraph
2, has made a value decision for life. In the reform of the abortion provisions it is accordingly not a question of the elimination
,of criminal offenses which have as their object behavior which
is not socially destructive. A reform of the penal law which is
oriented to the basic legal order must so structure the regulations
governing abortion that the protection of developing life is
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guaranteed at the first opportunity under the circumstances.
For this purpose, according to this view, the reform must do
justice to the principle of the legal inviolability of developing
life and at the same time strike a balance between the right of
the unborn child and the human dignity of the pregnant woman
as well as her right to the free development of her personality.
Therefore, an absolute precedence cannot be granted either to
the one right or to the other. In especially difficult conflict
situations, it is of importance to find solutions which takv into
account the value judgment of the constitution (loc. cit., p. 8).
According to this view, the regulation of terms could only
fulfill the expectations of public health, to which it is bound,
if every interruption of pregnancy within the first three months
appears to have the approval of the law. This would be incompatible with the hierarchy of values in the constitution. If
society recognizes developing life as a legal value worthy of protection and of comparably high rank, it could not make the
destruction of this legal value dependant upon the untrammeled
pleasure of the individual without coming into conflict with this
premise (loc. cit., p. 9).
From this point forward the draft rejected the "term solution
which was discussed in such a lively fashion in the time of the
Weimar Republic as well as at the present," and determined that
exceptions from the fundamental prohibition of the interruption
of pregnancy could only acquire validity by establishing a statutory indication. An indication should be assumed,
a) if the interruption of the pregnancy was indicated in the
judgment of medical science in order to avert from the pregnant
woman the danger for her life or the danger of a serious impairment of the state of her health insofar as the danger could not
be averted in any other way which was exactable for her (§219
Medical Indication).
b) if, according to the judgment of medical science, compelling reasons require the assumption that the child, as a
consequence of an heriditary disposition or the consequence of
harmful influences before birth, will suffer damage to its condition of health which cannot be alleviated and which condition
is so serious that the continuation of the pregnancy cannot be
demanded from the pregnant woman, provided that not more
than 20 weeks have elapsed since the beginning of the pregnancy
(§219b Eugenic or Indication from the Condition of the Child).
c) when an illegal act has been committed against the
pregnant woman pursuant to §176 (the sexual abuse of children),
§177 (rape) or §179, Par. 1 (the sexual abuse of those incapable
of resistance) and compelling reasons require the assumption
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that the pregnancy resulted from the act, provided that no more
than twelve weeks have elapsed since the beginning of the pregnancy (§219c Ethical or Criminalogical Indication).
d) if the interruption of the pregnancy is indicated in order
to avert from the pregnant woman the danger of a grave
calamity, provided that the danger cannot be averted in another
way that is exactable from her and if not more than twelve
weeks have elapsed since the beginning of the pregnancy (§219d
Social or Emergency Indication).
In the presence of one of these indications an interruption
of pregnancy performed by a physician with the consent of the
pregnant woman should jot be punishable under §218. The
commencement of pregnancy within the sense of the statute was
fixed at the conclusion of the process of implantation of the
fertilized egg in the uterus (§218, Par. 5).
At the same time, Representatives Dr. DeWith and colleagues
proposed the draft of a statute for amending §218 of the Penal
Code (Federal Parliamentary Press, VI/3137) which would have
left interruption of pregnancy free of punishment in the first
three months provided it was performed by a physician with the
consent of the woman after medical consultation (regulation of
terms).
Both drafts were considered together in the Special Committee for the Reform of the Penal Law. On April 10, 11 and
12, 1972, a public hearing took place in which all of the questions
connected with the reform of the provisions governing abortion
were discussed in a comprehensive fashion by experts and
specialists in all relevant fields of speciality (cf. German Federal
Parliament, Sixth Election Period, 74, 75, 76 Session of the
Special Committee for Penal Law Reform from April 10, 11, 12,
1972, Stenographic Reports, p. 2141 to 2361). The premature
adjournment of the Sixth German Parliament led to the interruption of this deliberation.
In the seventh election period the Federal Government did
not introduce its own statutory draft. Instead, four drafts for
a statute were proposed from the membership of the Parliament.
The draft of Representatives Dr. Milller-Emmert and colleagues
contained a regulation of indications and provided in addition
that the pregnant woman should, in all cases, remain free of
punishment (Federal Parliamentary Press, 7/443). The draft of
the SPDF and the FDP,G on the other hand, suggested a regulaF. Social Democratic Party [hereinafter referred to, by the Court,
as SPD].
G. Free Democratic Party [hereinafter referred to, by the Court, as
FDP].
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tion of terms (Federal Parliamentary Press, 7/375).

In a draft

of the CDU/CSUH a narrower regulation of indications was proposed (medical-which included eugenic-and an ethical indication; disregard of the penalty in the situation of non-exactability
A draft introduced by
Federal Parliamentary Press, 7/554 -).
to limit freecolleagues
proposed
Representatives Dr. Heck and
dom from punishment for the interruption of pregnancy essentially to the case of a broadly-formulated medical indication
(Federal Parliamentary Press, 7/561).
All four drafts were referred to the Special Committee for
the Reform of the Penal Law for joint consideration. None of
these drafts, however, received the required majority (cf. Federal
Parliamentary Press 7/1982, p. 4). The Committee, therefore, did
not think itself in a position to recommend definite conclusions
to the full legislature but proposed -all four drafts for decision in
separate reports-cf. Federal Parliamentary Press, 7/1982, 7/1981
(new), 7/1983, 7/1984 (new). Regarding the regulation of terms
proposed by the SPD/FPD factions, which was later adopted by
the Federal Parliament, the following considerations were,
according to the report of the Special Committee-Federal Parliamentary Press, 7/1981 (new), p 9/10-especially decisive:
In the area of penal law the proponents of this draft suggest
that we revoke the sanction for the first three months of pregnancy in the interest of improving the counseling situation. That
is to say, the only duty imposed by penal law is for one to
undergo comprehensive counseling and to allow the operation to
be performed by a physician. Furthermore, this means that in
the first three months the protection of developing life will no
longer be guaranteed by a uniform penal sanction but rather by
a counseling system, utilization of which will be required by a
penal sanction. The supporters of the regulation of terms proceed from the premise that the penal sanction has a real effect
only after the third month. It has become evident that a general
criminal prohibition is not suited to guarantee the protection of
unborn life. A pregnant woman who will allow her pregnancy
to be interrupted will do this in any case without consideration
of the penal statute. She will, in every case, find a way to
obtain an abortion. The causes of the ineffectiveness of the penal
provision were persuasively clarified by, among others, the
experts in the public hearing who pointed out that the decision
to interrupt the pregnancy has its origin in circumstances of
serious conflict and is made in the depths of her personality,
which a threat of punishment is not capable of reaching
(Rolinski, AP VI, p. 2219, 2225; Schulte, AP VI, p. 2200; Brocher,
AP VI, p. 2209)...
The regulation of terms does not abandon the idea that the
unborn life requires defense and is worthy of it. The advocates
H. Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [hereinafter
referred to, by the Court, as CDU and CSU respectively].
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of this draft are only of the opinion that the penal law, properly
conceived, is not the suitable means...
In the case of an interruption of pregnancy, consultation and
assistance must (and can) intervene before the pregnant woman
has taken the decisive step. So long, however, as the woman
must fear any penal sanction, she will scarcely seek out consultation and assistance. A woman who, for whatever reasons,
wants to interrupt her pregnancy will rather either perform it
herself or seek out a physician or other person whom she knows
will perform the operation without asking very many questions.
.. . So long as there is a penal provision, it is difficult to reach
such women for consultation and assistance because, for the most
part, they only turn to such persons for "help" whom they are
certain will bring them closer to the desired interruption of pregnancy. For the most part, they do not come within reach of
anyone who could or would offer them genuine assistance.
In the voting in the second deliberation of the German
Parliament, neither of the drafts received the required majority
of votes. Thereupon, the two party drafts which had received
the highest number of oral votes were presented for decision.
Two hundred forty-five representatives voted for the draft of
of the SPD/FDP factions, 219 representatives for the application
of the CDU/CSU faction (cf. for particulars, German Federal
Parliament, Seventh Election Period, 95th Session, Stenographic
Reports, p. 6443).
In the final roll call vote on the draft of the SPD/FDP
faction, in the third deliberation, 247 deputies of a total number
of 489 with full voting rights answered with yes, 233 with no,
and nine abstained (German Federal Parliament, Seventh Election Period, 96th Session, Stenographic Reports, p. 6503).
The Federal Council designated the law which had been
decided upon as needing concurrence, but denied the concurrence
after a fruitless convoking of the Mediation Committee and made
a timely objection according to the provisions of Article 77, Paragraph 3, of the Basic Law (Federal Council, 406th Session from
May 31, 1974, Stenographic Reports, p. 214). This objection was
rejected by the Federal Parliament, which did not regard this
statute as requiring concurrence, on June 5, 1974, with 260 votes
against, 218 votes for, and with four abstentions (German Federal Parliament, Seventh Election Period, 104th Session, Stenoigraphic Reports, p. 6947).
7. To support the penal law reform through socio-political
measures, the German Federal Parliament on March 21, 1974,
passed a bill of the SPD/FDP factions (Federal Parliamentary
Press, 7/376), entitled the Statute to Supplement the Fifth
Statute to Reform the Penal Law (Statute to Supplement the
Penal Law Reform--SSPLR). In this statute, provision is made
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for, inter alia, claims for medical counseling regarding questions
of the regulation of conception as well as claims for medical
assistance for those abortions which are free of punishment.
These services are to be provided through statutory health insurrance and social assistance (Federal Parliamentary Press, 7/1753
and German Federal Parliament, Seventh Election Period, 88th
Session, Stenographic Reports, p. 5769).
The Federal Council refused to concur in this statutory
decision after an unsuccessful appeal to the Mediation Committee
(Federal Council, 410th Session from July 12, 1974, Stenographic
Reports, p. 324). Thereupon the Federal Government, on its own
initiative, called upon the Mediation Committee. Up to this time
the Committee had not arrived at any decision.
8. On June 21, 1974, the Federal Constitutional Court, upon
application of the government of the federal state of BadenWiirttemberg, issued a provisional order, according to which,
inter alia, §218a of the Penal Code in the version of the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law (5 PLRS) would not, for the time
being, take effect, although the interruption of pregnancy which
is indicated medically, eugenically or ethically within the first
twelve weeks after conception would remain free of punishment
(Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, 37, 324; Federal
Law Reporter, 1974 I, p. 1309). The provisional order was extended until the announcement of this judgment.
II.
One hundred ninety-three members of the German Parliament as well as the state governments of Baden-Wilrttemberg,
Bavaria, Rhineland-Pfalz, the Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein,
according to the provisions of Article 93, Paragraph 1, No. 2, of
the Basic Law and Section 13, No. 6, Statute of the Federal Constitutional Court, petitioned for constitutional review of §218a of
the Penal Code, in the version of the Fifth Statute to Reform
the Penal Law. They considered the provision to be inconsistent
with the Basic Law because the availability of abortion made
possible thereby during the first twelve weeks after conception
runs afoul of Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, in connection with Article 1, Paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the Basic Law
as well as the principle of the just state. The governments of
the petitioning states are further of the opinion that the concurrence of the Federal Council was necessary for the Fifth Statute
for the Reform of the Penal Law.
By way of reasoning, essentially the following is offered:
1. The statute contains in Articles 6 and 7 amendments to
the Code of Penal Procedure and to the Introductory Statute
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of the Penal Code and therefore to statutes which in their own
right were enacted with concurrence of the Federal Council.
This alone establishes the necessity of concurrence. The contrary
interpretation of the Federal Constitutional Court (Decisions of
the Federal Constitutional Court, 37, 363) should be reexamined.
Regardless, the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law
itself contains provisions which create the necessity for concurrence according to Article 84, Paragraph 1, of the Basic Law, since
in §218c, Par. 1, No. 1, of the Penal Code, there is provision for
the creation of "authorized counseling centers" and in §219, Par.
1, of the Penal Code, provision for verification of an indication
by a "competent center." Furthermore, even according to the
decision mentioned (loc. cit., p. 383), an amendatory statute is
in need of concurrence even if in fact it limits itself to the ordering of substantive questions if it puts into effect innovations in
the area which lend an essentially different meaning and scope
to the provisions for administrative procedures which themselves
have not explicitly been amended. This necessarily leads to a
requirement for concurrence in the amendatory statute, if the
original statute in fact contains no provisions concerning administrative procedure, although the amendatory statute encroaches
in such a way on the necessary provisions for the conduct of
administrative proceedings through the structuring of its substantive provisions that the states are committed on decisive points.
This would be the case here, since only a very slight latitude
would be allowed to the states id the structuring of the administrative process.
Finally, according to this view, this Statute and the Statute
to Supplement the Penal Law Reform must be viewed as a unity
because these statutes, in the nature of the case, are from a legal
point of view inextricably connected. The goal of the project
of reform is a "regulation of terms with counseling"; the counseling, for its part, is, however, first made possible for all the cases
which are in the focal point of the reform by the Statute to
Supplement the Penal Law Reform. Both statutes represented
a unified political decision. It would be, therefore, contradictory
if the repeal of the penal sanction and the provisions which make
counseling possible would be introduced in two separate bills.
Clearly, so the argument continues, this was done to circumvent
the concurrence of the Federal Council, since the Statute to Supplement the Penal Law Reform without any doubt required the
concurrence of the Federal Council. The Federal Parliament
would, therefore, so this reasoning concludes, exceed the bounds
of the discretion granted it by dividing the legal subject matter
to be regulated into several statutes.
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2. The fundamental right guaranteed by Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law, as the most fundamental
and most original human right, protects, in comprehensive
fashion, unborn life as well. This conception of the law is in
agreement with the history of its origin and with dominant
opinion, is in the tradition of German legal thinking, and can
find support in the literal wording of the constitution. Above
all, however, only this view of the law does justice to the recognizable function of a constitutional norm.
Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law, contains
according to this view, not only a right of defense against direct
attacks by the state but at the same time forms a foundation
for a positive demand for protection against the state. The duty
of protection can be inferred from the fundamental value
decision of the constitution for developing life, the specific function of which is to allow valuation expressed in Article 2, Paragraph. 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law to become fruitful in its
relationship to third parties. This obligation also flows directly
from Article 1, Paragraph 1, Sentence 2, of the Basic Law.
The protection corresponds to constitutional requirements
only if, in principle, it is comprehensively structured. This
conclusion rests not only on the particularly high rank of the
legal values of Article 2, Paragraph 2, of the Basic Law and on
the fact that every individual life enjoys the protection of the
fundamental right but even more decisively that violations of
the fundamental right with respect to (biological) life lead to the
total annihilation of the basis of human existence.
The legislature may certainly consider, in formulating a
protection for developing life, the spheres of rights of third parties which will eventually collide, particularly those of the
mother, insofar as the third party interests, for their part, are
supported by the constitution. Such a situation exists in the case
of danger to the life of the pregnant woman. The legislature,
however, can also come to the conclusion, in the case of grave
dangers for the woman of a different kind, that the involuntary
carrying of the child to term cannot be exacted. This is not to
say that the developing life is to be less respected as a legal value
than, for example, the health or other legal interests of the
woman. No doubt, the complete realization of the protection of
the developing life touches upon the borders of the legally
possible. The authority should be granted to the legislature,
therefore, to specify the factual basis of individual indications in greater detail. In this way, adequate room would be
given to take account of an eventual change of social value
conceptions in the course of the constitution. This point of view,
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however, must be rejected where no relevant legal interests of
the mother are in any way touched upon or where abortion
results from indifference or pure convenience.
The obligation of the state to protect unborn life, according
to this view, takes on a special significance when the elimination of a protection of the penal law which has existed for a
hundred years is at stake. Therefore, an especially stringent
examination is required to determine whether the elimination
of the protection does not conflict with the value decision of the
Basic Law regarding life.
With the regulation of terms solution, the state would
offend in several respects against the duty of protection incumbent upon it:
a) The legislature would violate its duty by legally allowing
the destruction of unborn life within the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy, if the only condition of the destruction is that it be
performed by a physician with the consent of the pregnant
woman. The allowance of abortion by the penal law cannot be
interpreted in any other way than in the sense of legal approval.
b) Furthermore, the legislature, by repealing the punishability of abortions during the first twelve weeks, deprives
prenatal life in the future of the socio-ethical appreciation of its
value among people. That penal norms possess power to form
the standards of socio-ethical judgment for the citizenry corresponds to proven findings of legal sociology.
c) If one should suggest that the state should further
differentiate the interruption of pregnancy, it would violate its
constitutional duty of protection by repealing the present penal
sanctions without exception for the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. Social welfare measures alone could not prevent pregnant women who desire abortion from realizing their intention. Thus, if they are not disposed to accept the offer of
help, the protection of unborn life will not be guaranteed by this
means. The disappearance of the penal sanction leaves behind
it a relevant gap in protection. The result is that the counseling proposed, as the sole measure of assistance, as it is regulated
in the statute, will be proven ineffective in practice. If the
pregnant woman knows that the decision ultimately depends
upon her alone, she will feel little inclination to allow this
decision to be made more difficult by the admonitions of a counselor. The counselors are also in a contradictory position: if a
pregnant woman should explain that she has decided for an abortion, the counselors would be faced with the alternatives either of
mechanically issuing the permission for the abortion or of forcing
on the pregnant woman, against her will, scruples of conscience
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which would only burden her later life even more. Furthermore,
too much is demanded of the physicians who would bear the main
burden of medical counseling.
According -to the view of the petitioners, it is true that the
legislature would have a certain latitude in determining whether
a penal sanction would be more harmful than useful. This latitude, however, would be narrowly limited by the overriding constitutional principle of demandability (the prohibition of excess).
If one would follow the theory of practical concordance which
has become dominant and the theory of balancing which preserves the most from the standpoint of both sides, the conflicting legal values must be so ordered to each other that each of
them retains its reality. It would verge on the total inversion
of these principles if an absolute precedence is conceded generally
to either of the conflicting values. On this concession, however,
is based the terms solution which awards to the power of selfdetermination of the woman an exclusive precedence, which in
truth places the power of decision in another person vis-a-vis
the fetus. In addition, according to such a theory, individual
lives would be weighed against other individual lives (or the
interests of health). Accordingly, what is involved is a kind of
abstract governmental counting out and reckoning of life against
life. In this way, however, the dominant and primary content
of the Basic Law, as it regards individual rights, found in Article
2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law is placed in question;
,there is no other fundamental right which aims directly at the
protection of the individual as such.
Furthermore, according to the petitioner's view, one could
attempt to legitimatize such a balancing only with the assumption that the number of lives saved could clearly be expected
to exceed the number of those sacrificed. It is, however, the
contrary which is well established. During the parliamentary
deliberations, the representatives of the Government explained
on the basis of comprehensive investigations and comparisons,
that even following the lower estimate, one could count on a
40% increase in the total number of legal and illegal abortions.
Finally, according to this view, it ought to be noted that the
regulation of terms is precisely what takes every opportunity
away from the woman in distress to mitigate pressure for an
abortion from the father or from others involved by pointing
to the illegality, the punishment and the risk of the behavior
demanded of her. In addition, counseling would be able to
change nothing, least of all counseling which does not permit
effective counter measures. Therefore, it is precisely the regulation of terms solution which would drive the pregnant woman
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into isolation and subject her to prejudicial pressures. The
regulation of terms is in truth an anti-social regulation.
3. The allowance of abortion in the first twelve weeks
would also violate Article 3 of the Basic Law, because a regulation of terms within which no legal defense exists for developing
life cannot be justified by any objective point of view. Further,
the regulation of terms violates Article 6, Paragraph 1, and Paragraph 4 of the Basic Law as well as the principle of the just
state.
III.
Of those constitutional organs which have been given the
opportunity for expression under Section 77 of the Statute of
the Federal Constitutional Court, the Federal Parliament and the
Federal Government have taken positions. The government of
the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia has explained that
it joins in the position taken by the Federal Government.
1. The Federal Minister of Justice, who expressed himself
on behalf of the Federal Government, contends that the petitions
are unfounded.
a) According to the decision of the Federal Constitutional
Court on June 25, 1974, the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal
Law did not require the concurrence of the Federal Council
(Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, 37, 363). It contains neither new provisions which establish the necessity for
concurrence nor does it alter regulations which were subject to
the requirement for concurrence. The legislature should not be
prevented from considering and ratifying separately the Fifth
Statute to Reform the Penal Law and the Statute to Supplement
the Penal Law Reform.
b) The regulation of terms proposed in the Fifth Statute
to Reform the Penal Law is compatible with Article 2, Paragraph
2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law.
The Federal Government has consistently proceeded from
the principle that unborn life is included in the protection of
Article 2, Paragraph 1, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law. Also in
the extensive deliberations in the Federal Parliament and the
Federal Council the constitutional status and the obligation to
protect the life of the unborn were beyond dispute.
Regardless of the obligation to provide an appropriate and
effective protection of the unborn life, Article 2, Paragraph 2,
Sentence 1, of the Basic Law does not require a protection of
the unborn life which is identical to that provided born persons.
The legislature, therefore, need not provide protection without
exception under the penal law for unborn life if the protection
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corresponds in another way with the requirement of the need
and worthiness of protection of unborn life.
This concept is confirmed above all by the history of the
origin of Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law.
From this history, it is clear that one need not proceed to the
defense of unborn life with compulsory and uniform penalization.
Uniformity of the protection would be necessary, to be sure,
so far as attacks by the state are to be averted. The point at
issue, however, is neither attacks by the state nor defense against
attacks by third parties, because the relationship of the child en
ventre sa mere to the mother is of a special kind. Even if the
child is recognized as an intrinsic legal value, the child en ventre
sa mere is united with the body and the life of the mother in
the most intimate manner conceivable. Nature has already
placed the protection in the direct care of the mother. The possibilities for the legal order to protect unborn life even against
the mother are limited by the nature of the situation. Penal
sanctions, according to previous experience, can only induce pregnant women to bearing the child to term in a limited measure,
if the willingness is not already present. The duty to protect,
therefore, cannot establish for the state a thoroughgoing duty
to punish. With the withdrawal of the penal sanction for an
interruption of pregnancy in the first weeks of pregnancy the
state does not bestow upon the mother a right to the operation.
The legislature merely limits the penal sanction with reference
to the fact that other arrangements for protection would be seen
as more appropriate and effective or to take account of interests
of the pregnant woman which are worthy of protection.
Constitutionally, it would not be possible to proceed from
a general duty on the part of the state to punish because the
legislature is obliged to consider opposing fundamental rights of
the pregnant woman herself and constitutional value decisions.
Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law works to
the benefit of pregnant women as a fundamental right, which
also belongs to them, to life and bodily integrity. In view of
the large number of interruptions of pregnancy not performed
by physicians, considerable weight must be given to the protection of the life and the health of pregnant women. Quackery
has indeed receded in comparison with earlier times 1jut still constitutes a considerable danger for the life and health of pregnant
women. In the case of illegal interruptions of pregnancy by
physicians, in critical cases, the required emergency and after
care is not always guaranteed, Furthermore it is necessary to
consider the personal responsibility of pregnant women. The
value decision in favor of the personal responsibility of the
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human being would have in this case a decisive constitutional
meaning to the extent that the legislature must directly take personal responsibility as a basis in regulating an area of life which
in large measure is impressed with the natural responsibility of
the woman for her child en ventre sa mere. The legislature,
according to this view, has the task, in the face of the reciprocally
influencing and limiting value decision and fundamental rights,
of taking account of all legal positions and bringing them into
balance.
Beyond that, in enacting penal law norms, it should be
considered that limits should be set to the penal law from the
"precept of sensible and moderate punishment." The guarantee
of constitutional value decisions through penal sanctions is not
required in every instance in which such a decision is present.
A thoroughgoing parallel of the ordering of values in constitutional\and penal law cannot be created; the two realms are not
identical.
No more extensive requirement for the structuring of the
general legal order can be inferred as a matter of principle from
Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law than that
of guaranteeing appropriate and effective protection of unborn
life. The legislature should take account of the guiding principles and spirit emanating from a constitutionally fundamental
decision. Beyond that, however, it has a free hand in structuring these measures.
c) The regulations of terms of the Fifth Statute to Reform
the Penal Law meet, in content and structure, the constitutional
demands of Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law.
The counseling of pregnant women during the first twelve weeks
of pregnancy, the basic part of the regulation of terms, guarantees even without penal sanction, the necessary protection of
unborn life.
The legislature should accordingly -proceed from the view
that the decision for an interruption of pregnancy as a rule
has its origin in a grave situation of conflict for the pregnant
woman and is made in the depths of the personality. A penal
provision, therefore, would not be able regularly to reach women
inclined to, or ready for, an interruption of pregnancy. On the
other hand, if a woman should consider an interruption of pregnancy in spite of the risk of her own health or indeed her own
life, a situation is presented which would require a program of
counseling and assistance. Both appear as not without prospects
since many of these women still vascillate in their decision and
have definitely not decided upon an interruption of pregnancy
from the beginning. Such women could be brought to a posi-
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tive attitude regarding pregnancy by means of thorough counseling. A thoroughgoing threat of punishment even for the first
period of pregnancy as it is proposed in the regulations for indications decisively weakens the effectiveness of the counseling and
offers of assistance. Since a regulation of indications inevitably
presupposes in a certain form a system of expert opinion, it subjects the pregnant woman to the compulsion of abiding by this
expert opinion. This, however, would be harmful to a candid
participation of the pregnant woman in the counseling and would
frequently lead in the cases of women inclined toward and ready
for abortion to the result that the path to counseling and to the
expert opinion center would be avoided from the beginning.
Furthermore, constitutional conclusions cannot be drawn
from the prognosis made in connection with the reform of §218
of the Penal Code. They must be based on unknown quantities
and therefore do not allow dependable conclusions. Moreover,
the mistaken prognoses accumulate, if the regulation lying at the
basis of the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal law is explained
as decriminalization and is compared with the legal situation in
other countries in which this must actually be so understood.
The aim of this statute is not the decriminalization of abortion but
rather the guaranteeing of an appropriate and effective protection for unborn life, even if in the place of a thoroughgoing
punishment for abortion an obligatory regulation is proposed
which for the first twelve weeks of pregnancy attributes to counseling as a preventive measure a greater aptitude than the threat
of punishment.
The legislature has, according to the view of the respondents,
effectively designed the counseling. Side by side with a counseling in which the medical viewpoint would stand in the forefront,
there is the instruction about the public and private assistance
available for pregnant women, mothers and children as well as
instruction regarding such help, which will facilitate the continuation of the pregnancy and the situation of mother and child.
That the counseling must be directed to the continuation of the
pregnancy is clear. The legislature ensures the counseling
through a penal sanction. By means of the Statute to Supplement the Penal Law Reform it is certain that the route to the
physician or to the counseling center will not be impeded by
financial considerations. The fear that the regulation of terms
would lead to "a bursting of the dike" in the legal consciousness
of our people is already convincingly refuted in scientific literature.
d) The qualified removal of the penal sanction for abortion
in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy does not violate Article
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3 of the Basic Law. The various provisions for protection are
not based upon a differing valuation of the child en ventre sa
mere according to its age, but are part of a unified regulation
which not only as a whole but also in its parts is directed
towards equal protection for the child en ventre sa mere and
arranges this protection in a manner which is effective and
appropriate to the respective stage and development. Also,
Article 6, Paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Basic Law as well as the
principle of the just state are not violated.
2. Representative Dr. Ehmke, who is an attorney as well
as a professor, delivered a statement of position on behalf of the
German Federal Parliament. He is likewise of the opinion that
the regulation of terms of the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal
Law would be compatible with the Basic Law. He denies the
need for concurrence for this statute for the same reasons as the
Federal Government.
He further explained:
The statute contains not a "perfect," but rather a sensible
solution of this problem of reform which has been discussed for
decades. The high number of illegal abortions, the small number
of convictions-which resulted in only light punishments-which
have had a negative effect on the social effectiveness of §218 of
the Penal Code, the disadvantage to women from socially weaker
classes who had to entrust themselves to quacks as well as the
consequent criminality compellingly demanded a reform of §218.
From the standpoint of public health as well as from the socialpolitical point of view the term-solution is preferable. It will
especially, with higher probability, decrease the number of illegal
abortions and the dangers to health connected with them for the
mothers and, furthermore, can check the consequent criminality.
In contrast to a solution based on indications, the regulation of
terms excludes both regional and individual inequality and thus
excludes injustice in the application of the elements of the indication as well as social inequality with respect to possibilities for
evasion of going to other countries. It eliminates the anxiety
of women about being rejected, which once again will drive them
toward illegality, and offers the mother, for the first time, the
opportunity for subsequent counseling without time pressure and
for responsible reflection. Strengthening the insight and the
personal responsibility of the women promises much more success than building on their fear of the penal sanction.
The question of the constitutionality of the term solution
cannot be answered from the language of Article 2, Paragraph
2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law and the history of the origin of
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this provision alone. From the proceedings of the Parliamentary
Council it was only concluded that the Council did not consciously desire to prejudice a reform of the penal provisions
regarding abortions and therefore did not expressly determine
whether and how far Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the
Basic Law would protect unborn life. Therefore, clarity with
respect to the interpretation of Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence
1, of the Basic Law is to be achieved by another route.
The
tion of
common
denoted
personal

use of the word "everyone" speaks against the assumpa fundamental right for unborn life, since both in
speech as well as in legal language a human person is
clearly with "everyone." Also in the legal sense, the
and human being first begins with birth.

With this, it is, to be sure, not yet decided whether and to
what extent unborn life represents a legal value protected by
Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law. In harmony
with the opinion dominant in the literature and unanimously
represented in the German Parliament, Article 2, Paragraph 2,
Sentence 1, of the Basic Law in conformity with its meaning and
purpose is to be so construed that it, as a fundamental norm of
the constitution, protects unborn life as the preliminary stage
of human life. With that, however, it remains completely undecided when the legal protection begins, what form the protection
is to take and how it is to differentiate among various potential
offenders.
This question can be answered neither by reference to teachings of the church or religious convictions nor with the methods
of natural science. Also, an appeal to Article 1, Paragraph 1,
and Article 19, Paragraph 2, of the Basic Law cannot offer any
additional knowledge. In the interpretation of the concept
"human being" the same questions of interpretation are presented in unanswered form. Article 19, Paragraph 2 of the Basic
Law determines not the scope of a fundamental right but rather
its essential meaning; before this determination can be approached, the question must therefore be examined, whether and
to what extent unborn life is protected at all by Article 2,
Paragraph 1, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law.
The question of penal protection for unborn life requires different answers which depend upon the potential offenders
against whom the protection is directed and the stage of development in which the unborn life finds itself. Even the history of
law shows that unborn life-both in the secular as well as canon
law-has always been protected differently and less strictly than
born life.
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Under canon law until the end of the 19th century only the
killing of an "ensouled" child en ventre sa mere was punishable
and in practice the 80th day after conception was accepted as
the point of ensoulment. Secular law, to begin with, has been
enduringly influenced by ecclesiastical theory and by canon law;
since the emergence of natural scientific thinking, penal protection attached at the commencement of the child's movement (in
the Common Law: quickening), until which time the interruption of pregnancy would be punished in an essentially milder
way. For population considerations, the General Provincial Law
of Prussia punished the interruption of pregnancy from conception forward, although it graduated the penal sanction after the
30th week of pregnancy, thus according to the viability of the
child.
That unborn life is not to be equated under penal law with
a 'human life is made evident by the fact that even the
opponents of the term solution had suggested elements for indications over and above the medical indication. From this mistaken point of departure, namely that unborn life is a legal value
of as much worth as a human life under the penal law, this
theory of penal law encountered difficulties in the cases of the
eugenic and ethical indications. Lastly, it is decisively a question
of the maintenance of the interests of the mother, along with
which one should simultaneously endeavor to protect those of the
one about to be born as much as possible. One should therefore
consider here the question from the point of view of the rights
of the mother and understand the penal provision of §218 of the
Penal Code in a dogmatically correct fashion as a statute that,
to protect the objective legal value of unborn life, preserves the
fundamental rights of the mother. This assessment of the interruption of pregnancy is generally to be observed in the legal consciousness of the free world, as a comparison of law in the other
countries of the Western World will show.
If one should view the situation in this way, the regulation
of terms would strengthen the fundamental rights of the woman
contained in Article 1, Paragraph 1, and Article 2, Paragraph 1,
of the Basic Law. This is not to say, of course, that her individual freedom could be unlimited. One should, in the question of
abortion, chiefly rely upon the personal responsibility of the
woman which, to be sure, ought not be misunderstood in the
sense of a "right of disposal" of the woman over the child en
ventre sa mere, which is not a part of the body of the woman.
A penal provision against interruption of pregnancy demands of
the woman not only, as in the case with third parties, a mere
omission, but rather the assumption of dangers to body and life,
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of physical and psychic burdens, as well as of duties which result
from the condition of being a mother and the responsibility for
the education, care and control of her children. Furthermore,
Article 6, Paragraph 1, of the Basic Law guarantees a realm of
private, familial structuring of life, which in principle is removed
from encroachments by the state. Today Article 6, Paragraph
1, of the Basic Law is to be interpreted in the light of the developing human right of family planning. Further a positive social
duty of protection on the part of the state results from Article
6, Paragraph 4, of the Basic Law. Finally, in Article 2, Paragraph
2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law, the life and health of the mother,
in contrast to the unborn life, are protected not merely as
objective legal values but also as genuine fundamental rights.
In balancing all of the considerations, Article 2, Paragraph
2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law, which as a fundamental norm
also protects unborn life, could not be construed to mean that
it requires a universal penalization of the interruption of pregnancy from the beginning of life forward.
The legislature has finally entered upon the way of a
positive protection of unborn life. The proposed counseling
should, on the one hand, show the woman what help she could
expect from society for the carrying of the pregnancy to term
and for her motherhood and, on the other hand, should bring
to her attention all of the medical viewpoints regarding pregnancy as well as the interruption of pregnancy. The Statute to
Supplement the Penal Law Reform should secure the counseling
through a claim for consultation and, beyond that, improve the
social insurance for the mother-to-be and therewith for the
developing life.
Prognoses about the future effect of a statute are naturally
burdened with considerable uncertainty. This is especially true
in an area in which one can only proceed, in the face of the extraordinarily high number of illegal abortions, from estimated
statistics. Valid here as well is the principle laid down by the
Federal Constitutional Court that a statutory measure may not
be viewed as being contrary to the constitution merely because
the measure might rest on a mistaken prognosis. Rather the
Constitutional Court has only to examine whether the assumptions of the legislature are so in error that they must be labeled
as legally unsound and indefensible.
IV.
The following persons addressed themselves to the constitutional questions at the oral proceedings on November 18 and 19,
1974:
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For the Petitioners: the Minister of Justice of the State of
Baden Wfirttemberg, Dr. Bender, the Minister for Family, Health
and Social Matters of the Saarland, Ms. Rita Waschbiisch,
Professors Dr. Lerche, Dr. Ossenbiihl and Dr. Rudolphi, attorney
Erhard, MP, as well as the Directors of the Ministries, Professor
Dr. Odersky (Bavaria) and Dr. Fischer (Rhineland-Pfalz; for the
German Parliament, its Vice-president Ms. Liselotte Funcke,
attorney Professor Dr. Ehmke and Professor Dr. Stratenwerth;
for the Federal Government, the Federal Minister of Justice, Dr.
Vogel, Professors Dr. Baumann and Dr. Peter Schneider, as well
as the Director of Ministry Bahlmann and the Ministerial Counselor, Harsdorf.
On the motion of the Federal government, Professor Dr.
JUrgens was heard as an expert.
B.
The Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law did not need
the concurrence of the Federal Council.
1. The statute, in Articles 6 and 7, alters, it is true, the Order
of Penal Procedure and the Introductory Statute to the Penal
Code which, for their part, were passed with the concurrence
of the Federal Council. This reason by itself, however, does not
necessitate concurrence (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional
Court, 37, 363). Further, the statute alters no statutory provisions, which, for their part, were in need of concurrence.
2. The Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law itself
contains no provisions which under Article 84, Paragraph 1, or
any other provision of the Basic Law require concurrence.
Neither §218 nor §219 of the Penal Code regulates the establishment of authorities or administrative procedure. Rather, they
merely establish the substantive legal prerequisites of nonpunishable interruption of pregnancy. This is also true, insofar
as §218c, Par. 1, No. 1, of the Penal Code, requires that the pregnant woman, before the abortion, present herself to an authorized counseling center and describe the object of the counseling.
The setting up and establishment of counseling centers as well
as the decreeing of administrative provisions for procedures to
be followed by these centers are completely relegated to the federal states. For the same reasons §219 of the Penal Code does
not create a need for concurrence of the Federal Council by
requiring the verification of the substantive prerequisites by "an
authorized center" before performing an abortion indicated
under §218b.
3. The petitioning state governments cannot be followed in
concluding that concurrence is necessary insofar as they refer
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to the legal principle established in the decision of June 25, 1974,
according to which an amendatory statute required the concurrence of the Federal Council "if, through the alteration of substantive legal norms, provisions regarding the administrative procedures which are not expressly altered experience an essentially
different meaning and scope in a construction which is oriented
to the purpose of the statute" (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, 37, 363, Fourth Guiding Principle and 383). The
actual prerequisites for a direct application of this guiding principle are unquestionably not present here. Whether a continued
extension of this legal principle in the sense proposed by the government of the federal state of Rhineland-Pfalz could come into
consideration at all is uncertain. Even according to this view
of the law, no requirement for concurrence for the Fifth Statute
to Reform the Penal Law arises since an even greater latitude
to structure remains with the federal states under the substantive provisions for the administrative regulations incumbent
upon them.
4. Finally, no requirement for concurrence can be inferred
from the close connection of the Fifth Statute to Reform the
Penal Law with the Statute to Supplement the Penal Law
Reform which, with the content given it by the Federal Parliament, is viewed as needing concurrence. Regardless of that, the
Statute to Supplement the Penal Law Reform has not yet taken
effect. The legislature is not prevented as a matter of principle
in the excercise of its legislative freedom from dividing a statutory plan into several individual statutes. The Federal Constitutional Court has, up to this time, proceeded upon the principle
that such divisions were permissible (cf. Decisions of the Federal
Constitutional Court, 34, 9 28; 37, 363 382). In the decision (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, 24, 184 199f.) Apostille-the Court left unanswered the question whether there
are constitutional limits to the authority and where these limits
are to be found. In any event, such limits are not transgressed
in this case.
The Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law and the planned
Statute to Supplement the Penal Law Reform were indeed voted
upon consecutively. However, they must not necessarily be considered a statutory and technical unity. The first named statute
contains in essence only penal law and penal procedure. In contrast, the Statute to Supplement the Penal Law Reform contains
social and labor law measures. The independence in content of
the Statute to Supplement the Penal Law Reform from the Fifth
Statute to Reform the Penal Law obviously results from the fact
that the Statute to Supplement the Penal Law Reform, accord-
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ing to its very wording, would be applicable to all of the proposed
solutions for the new regulation of pregnancy termination,
namely the "term solution" as well as the three indication
solutions.
C.
The question of the legal treatment of the interruption of
pregnancy has been discussed publicly for decades from various
points of view. In fact, this phenomenon of social life raises
manifold problems of a biological, especially human-genetic,
anthropological, medical, psychological, social, social-political,
and not least of an ethical and moral-theological nature, which
touch upon the fundamental questions of human existence. It
is the task of the legislature to evaluate the many sided and often
opposing arguments which develop from these various ways of
viewing the question, to supplement them through considerations
which are specifically legal and political as well as through the
practical experiences of the life of the law, and, on this basis,
to arrive at a decision as to the manner in which the legal order
should respond to this social process. The statutory regulation
in the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law which was decided
upon after extraordinarily comprehensive preparatory work can
be examined by the Constitutional Court only from the viewpoint of whether it is compatible with the Basic Law, which is
the highest valid law in the Federal Republic. The gravity and
the seriousness of the constitutional question posed becomes
clear, if it is considered that what is involved here is the protection of human life, one of the central values of every legal order.
The decision regarding the standards and limits of legislative
freedom of decision demands a total view of the constitutional
norms and the hierarchy of values contained therein.
I.

1. Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law also
protects the life developing itself in the womb of the mother
as an intrinsic legal value.
a) The express incorporation into the Basic Law of the selfevident right to life-in contrast to the Weimar Constitutionmay be explained principally as a reaction to the "destruction
of life unworthy of life," to the "final solution" and "liquidations," which were carried out by the National Socialistic Regime
as measures of state. Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the
Basic Law, just as it contains the abolition of the death penalty
in Article 102, includes "a declaration of the fundamental worth
of human life and of a concept of the state which stands, in
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emphatic contrast to the philosophies of a political regime to
which the individual life meant little and which therefore practiced limitless abuse with its presumed right over life and death
of the citizen" (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court,
18, 112 117).
b) In construing Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the
Basic Law, one should begin with its language: "Everyone has
a right to life . . ."I Life, in the sense of historical existence
of a human individual, exists according to definite biologicalphysiological knowledge, in any case, from the 14th day after
conception (nidation, individuation) (cf. on this point the statements of Hinrichsen before the Special Committee for the
Reform of the Penal Law, Sixth Election Period, 74th Session,
Stenographic Reports, p. 2142 ff.). The process of development
which has begun at that -point is a continuing process which
exhibits no sharp demarcation and does not allow a precise
division of the various steps of development of the human life.
The process does not end even with birth; the phenomena of consciousness which are specific to the human personality, for
example, appear for the first time a rather long time after birth.
Therefore, the protection of Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1,
of the Basic Law cannot be limited either to the "completed"
human being after birth or to the child about to be born which
is independently capable of living. The right to life is guaranteed
to everyone who "lives"; no distinction can be made here between
various stages of the life developing itself before birth, or
between unborn and born life. "Everyone"'J in the sense of
Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law is "everyone living"; expressed in another way: every life possessing
human individuality; "everyone" also includes the yet unborn
human being.
c) In opposition to the objection that "everyone" commonly
denotes, both in everyday language as well as in legal language,
a "completed" person and that a strict interpretation of the language speaks therefore against the inclusion of the unborn life
within the effective area of Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1,
of the Basic Law, it should be emphasized that, in any case, the
sense and purpose of this provision of the Basic Law require that
the protection of life should also be extended to the life developing itself. The security of human existence against encroachments by the state would be incomplete if it did not also embrace
the prior step of "completed life," unborn life.
This extensive interpretation corresponds to the principle
I. "Jeder hat das Recht auf Leben .
J. "Jeder."
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established in the opinions of the Federal Constitutional Court,
"according to which, in doubtful cases, that interpretation is to
be selected which develops to the highest degree the judicial
effectiveness of the fundamental legal norm" (Decisions of the
Federal Constitutional Court. 32, 54 71; 6, 55 72).
d) In support of this result the legislative history of Article
2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law may be adduced
here.
After the German Party (DP) had made repeated moves to
make explicit reference to "germinating life" in connection with
-the right to life and bodily inviolability (Federal Council
Press 11.48 - 298 and 12.48 - 398), the Parliamentary Council
deliberated -on this circle of problems for the first time in
its Committee for Fundamental Questions, the 32nd session,
held on January 11, 1949. In the discussion of the question
whether a provision should be incorporated into the Basic Law
which would forbid medical operations which do not serve
health, Representative Dr. Heuss (FDP) explained, without
encountering opposition, that compulsory sterilization and abortion in connection with the right to life were at issue. The Main
Committee of the Parliamentary Council in its 42nd session on
January 18, 1949, thoroughly dealt with, during the second reading on fundamental rights (proceedings of the Chief Committee
of the Parliamentary Council, Stenographic Reports, p. 529 ff.),
the question of the inclusion of developing life in the protection
of the constitution. Parliamentary Representative Dr. Seebohm
(DP) proposed to add both of the following sentences to Article
2, Paragraph 1, of the Basic Law as it existed at that time:
"Germinating life is protected" and "the death penalty is abolished." On this point Dr. Seebohm (loc. cit., p. 533 f.) commented
that the right to life and bodily inviolability possibly does not
unconditionally embrace germinating life as well. Therefore, he
concluded, it must be specially mentioned in this context. At
the least, he continued, one must expressly enter into the record
that germinating life is explicitly included in the right to life
and bodily inviolability, if another interpretation is possible.
Parliamentary Representative Dr. Weber explained in the
name of the CDU/CSU that her faction, when it intercedes for
the right to life, means life simply; and, in the faction's view,
germinating life, and above all, the defense of germinating life
is contained in the right (loc. cit., p. 534). Dr. Heuss (FDP)
agreed with Dr. Weber that the concept of life also embraces
developing life; however, matters should not be placed in the
constitution which are regulated in the penal law. As a consequence, he considered both the mention of germinating life as
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well as the death penalty as a special question to be superfluous
(loc. cit., p. 535).
"After the unopposed explanations according to which
germinating life is embraced in the right to life and bodily inviolability," Dr. Seebohm desired to withdraw his motion (loc. cit.,
p. 535). However Parliamentary Representative Dr. Greve
(SPD) declared: "I must explicitly say here, for the record, that
at the least as far as I am concerned, I do not understand the
right of germinating life to be within the right to life. I would
also like on behalf of my friends, at least for the great majority
of them, to deliver a clarification of like content in order to establish for the minutes that the Main Committee of the Parliamentary Council in its entirety does not adopt the standpoint which
my colleague Dr. Seebohm just expressed." The motion of Dr.
Seebohm was presented once again at that point but was indeed
rejected by eleven votes to seven (loc. cit., p. 535). In the written report of the Main Committee (page 7), however, Parliamentary Representative Dr. von Mangoldt (CDU) explained with
regard to Article 2 of the Basic Law: "With the guaranteeing
of the right to life, germinating life should also be protected.
The motions introduced by the German Party in the Main
Committee to attach a particular sentence about the protection
of germinating life did not attain a majority only because, according to the view prevailing in the Committee, the value to be protected was already secured through the present version."
The plenary Parliamentary Council concurred in Article 2,
Paragraph 2, of the Basic Law on May 6, 1949, in the second reading, there being two votes in opposition. At the third reading
on May 8, 1949, both Parliamentary Representatives Dr. Seebohm
as well as Dr. Weber stated that, according to their conception,
Article 2, Paragraph 2, of the Basic Law would also include germinating life within the protection of this fundamental right
(proceedings of the Parliamentary Council, Stenographic Reports, p. 218, 223). The comments of both speakers stood without
opposition.
The history of the origin of Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence
1, of the Basic Law suggests that the formulation "everyone has
the right to life" should also include "germinating" life. In any
case, even less can be concluded from the materials on behalf
of the contrary point of view. On the other hand, no evidence
is found in the legislative history for answering the question
whether unborn life must be protected by the penal law.
e) Furthermore, in the deliberations on the Fifth Statute
to Reform the Penal Law there was unity regarding the value
of protecting unborn life, although, to be sure, the constitutional
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structure of the problem has not been treated definitively. In
the report of the Special Committee for the Reform of the Penal
Law on the statutory draft introduced by the Factions of the
SPD and FPD, inter alia,it was stated on this point:
The legal value of unborn life is to be respected in principle
equally with that of born life.
This determination is self-evident for the stage in which
unborn life would also be capable of independent life outside
of the mother's womb. The determination, however, is already
justified for the earlier stage of development which begins
approximately 14 days after conception, as, among others,
Hinrichsen convincingly established in the public hearing (AP,
VI, p. 2142 ff.). . . . That in the entire later development
no corresponding point of demarcation may be established in the
process is the completely overwhelming view in medical, anthropological, and theological science...
Therefore, it is impermissible to deny the existence of
unborn life from the end of nidation on or to contemplate it
merely with indifference. The question debated in the literature
whether, and if the occasion arises, to what extent the Basic
Law should include unborn life in its protection, need not be
answered at this point. In any case, if one disregards the
extreme ideas of individual groups, the concept of unborn life
as a legal value of high rank corresponds to the general public's
understanding of the law. This understanding of the law also
lies at the basis of this draft.
(Federal Parliamentary Press, 7/1981, new, p. 5)
Nearly of the same tenor are, to an extent, the committee
reports regarding the remaining drafts (Federal Parliamentary
Press, 7/1982, p. 5, Federal Parliamentary Press, 7/1983, p. 5,
Federal Parliamentary Press, 7/1984, new, p. 4).
2. The duty of the state to protect every human life may
therefore be directly deduced from Article 2, Paragraph 2,
Sentence 1, of the Basic Law. In addition to that, the duty also
results from the explicit provision of Article 1, Paragraph 1, Sentence 2, of the Basic Law since developing life participates in
the protection which Article 1, Paragraph 1, of the Basic Law
guarantees to human dignity. Where human life exists, human
dignity is present to it; it is not decisive that the bearer of this
dignity himself be conscious of it and know personally how to
preserve it. The potential faculties present in the human being
from the beginning suffice to establish human dignity.
3. On the other hand, the question disputed in the present
proceeding as well as in judicial opinions and in scientific literature whether the one about to be born himself is a bearer of
the fundamental right or, on account of a lesser capacity to
-possess legal and fundamental rights, is "only" protected in his
right to life by the objective norms of the constitution need not
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be decided here. According to the constant judicial utterances
of the Federal Constitutional Court, the fundamental legal norms
contain not only subjective rights of defense of the individual
against the state but embody, at the same time, an objective
ordering of values, which is valid as a constitutionally fundamental decision for all areas of the law and which provides direction and impetus for legislation, administration, and judicial
opinions (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, 7, 198
205 -Lfth-; 35, 79 114-High School Decisions-for further
sources). Whether and, if so, to what extent the state is obligated by the constitution to legal protection of developing life
can therefore be concluded from the objective-legal content of
the fundamental legal norms.
II.

1. The duty of the state to protect is comprehensive. It
forbids not only-self-evidently-direct state attacks on the life
developing itself but also requires the state to take a position
protecting and promoting this life, that is to say, it must, above
all, preserve it even against illegal attacks by others. It is for
the individual areas of the legal order, each according to its
special function, to effectuate this requirement. The degree of
seriousness with which the state must take its obligation to protect increases as the rank of the legal value in question increases
in importance within the order of values of the Basic Law.
Human life represents, within the order of the Basic Law, an
ultimate value, the particulars of which need not be established;
it is the living foundation of human dignity and the prerequisite
for all other fundamental rights.
2. The obligation of the state to take the life developing
itself under protection exists, as a matter of principle, even
against the mother. Without doubt, the natural connection of
unborn life with that of the mother establishes an especially
unique relationship, for which there is no parallel in other circumstances of life. Pregnancy belongs to the sphere of intimacy
of the woman, the protection of which is constitutionally guaranteed through Article 2, Paragraph 1, in connection with Article
1, Paragraph 1, of the Basic Law. Were the embryo to be considered oay as a.part of the maternal organism the interruption
of pregnancy would remain in the area of the private structuring of one's life, where the legislature is forbidden to encroach
(Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, 6, 32 41 ; 6, 389
433 ; 27, 344 350 ; 32, 373 379 ). Since, however, the one about to
be born is an independent human being who stands under the protection of the constitution, there is a social dimension to the
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interruption of pregnancy which makes it amenable to and in
need of regulation by the state. The right of the woman to the
free development of her personality, which has as its content the
freedom of behavior in a comprehensive sense and accordingly
embraces the personal responsibility of the woman to decide
against parenthood and the responsibilities flowing from it, can
also, it is true, likewise demand recognition and protection. This
right, however, is not guaranteed without limits-the rights of
others, the constitutional order, and the moral law limit it. A
priori, this right can never include the authorization to intrude
upon the protected sphere of right of another without justifying
reason or much less to destroy that sphere along with the life
itself; this is even less so, if, according to the nature of the case,
a special responsibility exists precisely for this life.
A compromise which guarantees the protection of the life of
the one about to be born and permits the pregnant woman the
freedom of abortion is not possible since the interruption of pregnancy always means the destruction of the unborn life. In the
required balancing, "both constitutional values are to be viewed
in their relationship to human dignity, the center of the value
system of the constitution" (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, 35, 202 225 ). A decision oriented to Article 1, Paragraph 1, of the Basic Law must come down in favor of the precedence of the protection of life for the child en ventre sa mere
over the right of the pregnant woman to self-determination. Regarding many opportunities for development of personality, she
can be adversely affected through pregnancy, birth and the education of her children. On the other hand, the unborn life is
destroyed through the interruption of pregnancy. According to
the principle of the balance which preserves most of competing
constitutionally protected positions in view of the fundamental
idea of Article 19, Paragraph 2, of the Basic Law;K precedence
must be given to the protection of the life of the child about
to be born. This precedence exists as a matter of principle for
the entire duration of pregnancy and may not be placed in question for any particular time. The opinion expressed in the Federal Parliament during the third deliberation on the Statute to
Reform the Penal Law, the effect of which is to propose the
precedence for a particular time "of the right to self-determination of the woman which flows from human dignity vis-a-vis all
others, including the child's right to life" (German Federal
Parliament, Seventh Election Period, 96th Session, Stenographic
Reports, p. 6492), is not reconcilable with the value ordering of
the Basic Law.
K. Article 19, Paragraph 2, of the Basic Law provides: "In no event
may a fundamental right be impaired in its essential meaning."
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3. From this point, the fundamental attitude of the legal
order which is required by the constitution with regard to the
interruption of pregnancy becomes clear: the legal order may
not make the woman's right to self-determination the sole guideline of its rulemaking. The state must proceed, as a matter of
principle, from a duty to carry the pregnancy to term and therefore to view, as a matter of principle, its interruption as an injustice. The condemnation of abortion must be clearly expressed
in the legal order. The false impression must be avoided that
the interruption of pregnancy is the same social process as, for
example, approaching a physician for healing an illness or indeed
a legally irrelevant alternative for the prevention of conception.
The state may not abdicate its responsibility even through the
recognition of a "legally free area," by which the state abstains
from the value judgment and abandons this judgment to the
decision of the individual to be made on the basis of his own
sense of responsibility.
III.
How the state fulfills its obligation for an effective protection of developing life is, in the first instance, to be decided
by the legislature. It determines which measures of protection
are required and which serve the purpose of guaranteeing an
effective protection of life.
1. In this connection the guiding principle of the precedence
of prevention over repression is also valid particularly for the
protection of unborn life (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional
Court, 30, 336 350). It is therefore the task of the state 'to
employ, in the first instance, social, political, and welfare means
for securing developing life. What can happen here and how
the assistance measures are to be structured in their particulars
is largely left to the legislature and is generally beyond judgment by the Constitutional Court. Moreover, the primary concern is to strengthen readiness of the expectant mother to accept
the pregnancy as her own responsibility and to bring the child
en ventre sa mere to full life. Regardless of how the state fulfills its obligation to protect, it should not be forgotten that
developing life itself is entrusted by nature in the first place to
the protection of the mother. To reawaken and, if required, to
strengthen the maternal duty to protect, where it is lost, should
be the principal goal of the endeavors of the state for the protection of life. Of course, the possibilities for the legislature to
influence are limited. Measures introduced by the legislature are
frequently only indirect and effective only after completion of
the time-consuming process of comprehensive education and the
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alteration in the attitudes and philosophies of society achieved
thereby.
2. The question of the extent to which the state is obligated
under the constitution to employ, even for the protection of
unborn life, the penal law, the sharpest weapon standing at its
disposal, cannot be answered by the simplified posing of the question whether the state must punish certain acts. A total consideration is necessary which, on the one hand, takes into account
the worth of the injured legal value and the extent of the social
harm of the injurious act-in comparison with other acts which
socio-ethically are perhaps similarly assessed and which are subject to punishment-and which, on the other hand, takes into
account the traditional legal regulation of this area of life as well
as the development of concepts of the role of the penal law in
modern society; and, finally, does not leave out of consideration
the practical effectiveness of penal sanctions and the possibility
of their replacement through other legal sanctions.
The legislature is not obligated, as a matter of principle, to
employ the same penal measures for the protection of the
unborn life as it considers required and expedient for born life.
As a look at legal history shows, this was never the case in the
application of penal- sanctions and is also true for the situation
in the law up to the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law.
a) The task of penal law from the beginning has been to
protect the elementary values of community life. That the life
of every individual human being is among the most important
legal values has been established above. The interruption of
pregnancy irrevocably destroys an existing human life. Abortion
is an act of killing; this is most clearly shown by the fact that
the relevant penal sanction---even in the Fifth Statute to Reform
the Penal Law-is contained in the section "Felonies and Misdemeanors against Life" and, in the previous penal law, was
designated the "Killing of the Child en ventre sa mere." The
description now common, "interruption of pregnancy," cannot
camouflage this fact. No legal regulation can pass over the fact
that this act offends against the fundamental inviolability and
indisposability of human life protected by Article 2, Paragraph
2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law. From this point of view, the
employment of penal law for the requital of "acts of abortion"
is to be seen as legitimate without a doubt; it is valid law in
most cultural states-under prerequisites of various kinds-and
especially corresponds to the German legal tradition. Therefore,
it follows that the law cannot dispense with clearly labeling this
procedure as "unjust."
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b) Punishment, however, can never be an end in itself. Its
employment is in principle subject to the decision of the legislature. The legislature is not prohibited, in consideration of the
points of view set out above, from expressing the legal condemnation of abortion required by the Basic Law in ways other than
the threat of punishment. The decisive factor is whether the
totality of the measures serving the protection of the unborn life,
whether they be in civil law or in public law, especially of a
social-legal or of a penal nature, guarantees an actual protection
corresponding to the importance of the legal value to be secured.
In the extreme case, namely, if the protection required by the
constitution can be achieved in no other way, the lawgiver can
be obligated to employ the means of the penal law for the protection of developing life. The penal norm represents, to a certain
extent, the "ultimate reason" in the armory of the legislature.
According to the principle of proportionality, a principle of the
just state, which prevails for the whole of the public law, including constitutional law, the legislature may make use of this
means only cautiously and with restraint. However, this final
means must also be employed, if an effective protection of life
cannot be achieved in other ways. The worth and the importance of the legal value to be protected demand this. It is not
a question of an "absolute" duty to punish but rather one of
a "relative" duty to use the penal sanction, which grows out
of the insight into the inadequacy of all other means.
On the other hand, the objection that a political duty to
punish can never be deduced from a norm of the Basic Law
which guarantees freedom is not decisive. If the state is obligated by a fundamental norm which determines value to protect
an especially important legal value effectively even against the
attacks of third parties, measures will often be unavoidable
which touch upon the areas of freedom of other bearers of fundamental rights. In this respect, the legal situation in the employment of social-legal or civil law means is not fundamentally different than the enactment of a penal norm. Differences exist,
perhaps, with respect to the intensity of the required interference. In any case, the legislature must resolve the conflict
which arises from this situation through a balancing of both of
the fundamental values or areas of freedom which are in opposition to each other according to the standard of the ordering of
values in the Basic Law and in consideration of the constitutional
principle of proportionality. If one were to deny that there was
any duty to employ the means of the penal law, the protection
of life which is to be guaranteed would be essentially restricted.
The seriousness of the sanction threatened for the destruction
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is to correspond to the worth of the legal value threatened with
destruction. The elementary value of human life requires criminal law punishment for its destruction.
3. The obligation of the state to protect the developing life
exists-as shown-against the mother as well. Here, however,
the employment of the penal law may give rise to special problems which result from the unique situation of the pregnant
woman. The incisive effects of a pregnancy on the physical and
emotional condition of the woman are immediately evident and
need not be set forth in greater detail. They often mean a considerable change of the total conduct of life and a limitation of
the possibilities for personal development. This burden is not
always and not completely balanced by a woman finding new
fulfillment in her task as mother and by the claim a pregnant
woman has upon the assistance of the community (Article 6,
Paragraph 4, of the Basic Law). In individual cases, difficult,
even life-threatening situations of conflict may arise. The right
to life of the unborn can lead to a burdening of the woman which
essentially goes beyond that normally associated with pregnancy.
The result is the question of exactability, or, in other words, the
question of whether the state, even in such cases, may compel
the bearing of the child to term with the means of the penal
law. Respect for the unborn life and the right of the woman
not to be compelled to sacrifice the values in her own life in
excess of an exactable measure in the interest of respecting this
legal value are in conflict with each other. In such a situation
of conflict which, in general, does not allow an unequivocal moral
judgment and in which the decision for an interruption of pregnancy can attain the rank of a decision of conscience worthy of
consideration, the legislature is obligated to exercise special
restraint. If, in these cases, it views the conduct of the pregnant
woman as not deserving punishment and forgoes the use of penal
sanctions, the result, at any rate, is to be constitutionally
accepted as a balancing incumbent upon the legislature.
In determining the content of the criterion of non-exactability, circumstances, however, must be excluded which do not
seriously burden the obligated party, since they represent the
normal situation with which everyone must cope. Rather, circumstances of considerable weight must be present which render
the fulfillment of the duty of the one affected extraordinarily
more difficult, so that fulfillment cannot be expected from him
in fairness. These circumstances are especially present if the one
affected by fulfilling the duty is thrown into serious inner conflicts. The solution of such conflicts by criminal penalty does
not appear in general to be appropriate (cf. Decisions of the Fed-
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eral Constitutional Court, 32, 98 109 - Gesundbeter), since it
applies external compulsion where respect for the sphere of personality of the human being demands full inner freedom of
decision.
A continuation of the pregnancy appears to be non-exactable
especially when it is proven that the interruption is required "to
avert" from the pregnant woman "a danger for her life or the
danger of a grave impairment of her condition of health" (§218b,
No. 1, of the Penal Code in the version of the Fifth Statute to
Reform the Penal Law). In this case her own "right to life and
bodily inviolability" (Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the
Basic Law) is at stake, the sacrifice of which cannot be expected
of her for the unborn life. Beyond that, the legislature has a
free hand to leave the interruption of pregnancy free of punishment in the case of other extraordinary burdens for the pregnant
woman, which, from the point of view of non-exactability, are
as weighty as those referred to in §218b, No. 1. In this category
can be counted, especially, the cases of the eugenic (cf. Section
218b, No. 2, of the Penal Code), ethical (criminalogical), and of
the social or emergency indication for abortion which were contained in the draft proposed by the Federal Government in the
sixth election period of the Federal Parliament and were discussed both in the public debate as well as in the course of the
legislative proceedings. During the deliberations of the Special
Committee for the Reform of the Penal Law (Seventh Election
Period, 25th Session, Stenographic Reports, p. 1470 ff.), the representative of the Federal Government explained in detail and with
convincing reasons why, in these four cases of indication, the
bearing of the child to term does not appear to be exactable.
The decisive viewpoint is that in all of these cases another interest equally worthy of protection, from the standpoint of the
constitution, asserts its validity with such urgency that the
state's legal order cannot require that the pregnant woman must,
under all circumstances, concede precedence to the right of the
unborn.
Also, the indication arising from general emergency (social
indication) can be integrated here. Finally, the general social
situation of the pregnant woman and her family can produce
conflicts of such difficulty that, beyond a definite measure, a
sacrifice by the pregnant woman in favor of the unborn life cannot be compelled with the means of the penal law. In regulating this case, the legislature must so formulate the elements of
the indication which is to remain free of punishment that the
gravity of the social conflict presupposed will be clearly recognizable and, considered from the point of view of non-exactability,
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the congruence of this indication with the other cases of indication remains guaranteed. If the legislature removes genuine
cases of conflict of this kind from the protection of the penal
law, it does not violate its duty to protect life. Even in these
cases the state may not be content merely to examine, and if
the occasion arises, to certify that the statutory prerequisites for
an abortion free of punishment are present. Rather, the state
will also be expected to offer counseling and assistance with the
goal of reminding pregnant women of the fundamental duty to
respect the right to life of the unborn, to encourage her to continue the pregnancy and-especially in cases of social need-to
support her through practical measures of assistance.
In all other cases the interruption of pregnancy remains a
wrong deserving punishment since, in these cases, the destruction of a value of the law of the highest rank is subjected to
the unrestricted pleasure of another and is not motivated by an
emergency. If the legislature wants to dispense (even in this
case) with penal law punishment, this would be compatible with
the requirement to protect of Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence
1, of the Basic Law, only on the condition that another equally
effective legal sanction stands at its command which would
clearly bring out the unjust character of the act (the condemnation' by the legal order) and likewise prevent the interruptions
of pregnancy as effectively as a penal provision.
D.
If the challenged regulation of terms of the Fifth Statute
to Reform the Penal Law is examined according to these standards, the result is that the statute does not do justice, to the
extent required, to the obligation to protect developing life effectively which is derived from Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence
1, in conjunction with Article 1, Paragraph 1, of the Basic Law.
I.
The constitutional requirement to protect developing life is
directed in the first instance to the legislature. The duty is
incumbent on the Federal Constitutional Court, however, to
determine, in the exercise of the function allotted to it by the
Basic Law, whether the legislature has fulfilled this requirement.
Indeed, the Court must carefully observe the discretion of the
legislature which belongs to it in evaluating the factual conditions which lie at the basis of its formation of norms, which discretion is fitting for the required prognosis and choice of means.
The court may not put itself in the place of the legislature; it
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is, however, its task to examine carefully whether the legislature,
in the framework of the possibilities standing at its disposal, has
done what is necessary to avert dangers from the legal value
to be protected. This is also fundamentally true for the question
whether the legislature is obligated to utilize its sharpest means,
the penal law, in which case the examination can extend beyond
the individual modalities of punishment.
II.
It is generally recognized that the previous §218 of the Penal
Code, precisely because it threatened punishment without distinction for nearly all cases of the interruption of pregnancy,
has, as a result, only insufficiently protected developing life. The
insight that there are cases in which the penal sanction is not
appropriate has finally led to the point that cases actually deserving of punishment are no longer prosecuted with the necessary
vigor. In addition, with respect to this offense, there is, in the
nature of the case, the frequently difficult clarification of the
factual situation. Certainly, the statistics on the incidence of
illegal abortion differ greatly and it may hardly be possible to
ascertain reliable data on this point through empirical investigations. In any case, the number of the illegal interruptions of
pregnancy in the Federal Republic was high. The existence of a
general penal norm may have contributed to that, since the state
had neglected to employ other adequate measures for the protection of developing life.
The legislature, in the final version of the Fifth Statute to
Reform the Penal Law, proceeded from the guiding consideration
of the primacy of preventive measures over repressive sanctions
(cf. in this regard, the motions of the factions of the SPD and
FDP for resolution which were accepted by the Federal Parliament in connection with the enactment of the Fifth Statute to
Reform the Penal Law-Federal Parliamentary Press, 7/2042).
The statute is based upon the idea that developing life would
be better protected through individual counseling of the pregnant woman than through a threat of punishment, which would
remove the one determined upon the abortion from every
possible means of influence, which from a criminological point
of view would be mistaken and, in addition, has proven itself
without effect. On this basis the legislature has reached the decision to abandon the criminal penalty entirely for the first twelve
weeks of pregnancy under definite prerequisites and, in its place,
to introduce the preventive counseling and instruction (§§218a
and 218c).
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It is constitutionally permissible and to be approved if the
legislature attempts to fulfill its duty to improve protection of
unborn life through preventive measures, including counseling
to strengthen the personal responsibility of the woman. The regulation in question, however, encounters decisive constitutional
problems in several respects.
1. The legal condemnation of the interruption of pregnancy
required by the constitution must clearly appear in the legal
order existing under the constitution. Therefore, as shown, only
those cases can be excepted in which the continuation of the
pregnancy is not exactable from the woman in consideration of
the value decision made in Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1,
of the Basic Law. This absolute condemnation is not expressed
in the provisions of the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law
with regard to the interruption of pregnancy during the first
twelve weeks because the statute leaves unclear whether an
interruption of pregnancy which is not "indicated" is legal or
illegal after the repeal of the criminal penalty through §218a of
the Penal Code. This is true without reference to the fact that
§218a of the Penal Code presents itself technically as the creation
of an exception to the general penal provision of §218 of the
Penal Code. It is also true, independent of the view one should
take in this question whether the provision factually restricts
§218 of the Penal Code or whether it creates a legally justifying
reason or finally has as its content only a basis for excluding
guilt or punishment. With the unbiased reader of the statute
the impression must arise that §218a completely removes,
through the absolute repeal of punishibility, the legal condemnation-without consideration of the reasons-and legally allows
the interruption of pregnancy under the prerequisites listed
therein. The elements of §218 of the Penal Code recede into the
background since by far most interruptions of pregnancy, experience shows, are performed in the first twelve weeks-over 9/10according to the statements of the representative of the government (loc. cit., p. 1472). The picture which results is of a nearly
complete decriminalization of the interruption of pregnancy (see
also Roxin in: J. Baumann, editor, The Proscription of AbortionL §218, p. 185). Also in no other provision of the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law is the notion expressed that the
interruption of pregnancy which is not indicated in the first
twelve weeks will be legally condemned for the future. Even
Article 2 of the statute, according to which no one in principle
is obligated to participate in an interruption of pregnancy, mentions nothing about the legality or illegality of such a measure;
L. Title in German: "Das Abtreibungsverbot."
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this provision aims in the first place at making allowance for
the freedom of conscience of the individual and at protecting the
freedom of the ethical conviction of one who sees himself faced
with the question whether he can and should actively participate
in an interruption of pregnancy which is free of punishment in
conformity with §218a of the Penal Code.
A look at the proposed regulations in the Statute to Supplement the Penal Law Reform for the area of social law further
compels the conclusion that in the case of an interruption of
pregnancy in the first twelve weeks a procedure is involved
which is apparently legally unobjectionable and which therefore
should be socio-legally promoted and facilitated. Legal claims
under statutes for social services presuppose that the elements,
upon the fulfillment of which the services are guaranteed, do
not represent a legally prohibited (condemned) act. The proposed regulation, as a whole, can therefore only be interpreted
to mean that an interruption of pregnancy performed by a physician in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy is not illegal and
therefore should be allowed (under law).
The Federal Government also proposed this concept in the
statutory bill introduced in the sixth election period of the German Federal Parliament; there, in the commentary to Article
1, one reads as follows (Federal Parliamentary Press, VI/3434,
p. 9):
Although the legislature may trust in other areas that a
repeal of penal prohibitions will not be understood as legal
approbation of the behavior previously punishable, special points
are to be considered in the new regulation of the interruption
of pregnancy: the term solution can only fulfill the public health

task expected of it, if every interruption of pregnancy during
the first three months appears as legally approved. The operation must be performed within the framework of general medical
care. The contract for medical treatment must be effective. Not
least, because of the inapplicability of Sections 134-138 of the
Civil Code, these and other circumstances can only be interpreted
in the sense that the legal order recognizes the operation, before
the expiration of the three month period, in every case as a
normal social process.
The representative of the Government expressed himself
similarly before the Special Committee for Penal Law Reform
(Seventh Election Period, 25th Session, Stenographic Reports, p.
1473):
It is important to keep this much in mind: medical interruption of pregnancy during the first trimester of pregnancy is,
within the framework of the regulation of terms, not contrary to
law; it is permitted. Only in this way can its integration into the
system of the penal law-with freedom from punishment even
for the participants (exception of emergency service) -be justi-
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fied and only in such a way can the civil law implications-the
validity of the contract for treatment in spite of Section 134-,
the promotion of the procedure through public health measures
and, above all else, the social insurance planned in the Statute
to Supplement the Penal Law Reform, be established.
2. A formal statutory condemnation of the interruption of
pregnancy would, furthermore, not suffice because the woman
determined upon abortion would disregard it. The legislature
which passed the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law has
replaced the penal norm with a counseling system in §218c of
the Penal Code on the judgment that positive measures to protect developing life are also required for an interruption of pregnancy performed by a physician with the consent of the pregnant
woman. Through the complete repeal of punishability, however,
a gap in the protection has resulted which completely destroys
the security of the developing life in a not insignificant
number of cases by handing this life over to the completely unrestricted power of disposition of the woman. There are many
women who have previously decided upon an interruption of
pregnancy without having a reason which is worthy of esteem
within the value order of the constitution and who are not
accessible to a counseling such as §218c, Par. 1, proposes. These
women find themselves neither in material distress nor in a grave
situation of emotional conflict. They decline pregnancy because
they are not willing to take on the renunciation and the natural
motherly duties bound up with it. They have serious reasons
for their conduct with respect to the developing life; there are,
however, no reasons which can endure against the command to
protect human life. For these women, pregnancy is exactable
in line with the principles reiterated above. The behavior even
of this group of women, legitimatized by law through the absence
of a constitutionally important motive for the interruption of
pregnancy, is fully covered under §218a of the Fifth Statute to
Reform the Penal Law. The life developing itself is abandoned
without protection to their arbitrary decision.
The objection against this is that women not subject to
influence understand best from experience how to avoid punishment so that the penal sanction is often ineffective. Furthermore, the legislature is confronted with the dilemma that preventive counseling and repressive threat of punishment in their life
protecting effect are necessarily partially exclusive: the penal
sanction of the indication solution would, in truth, through its
deterrent effect prevent unmotivated interruptions of pregnancy
to an extent not exactly ascertainable. At the same time, according to this objection, the threat of punishment, by discouraging
counseling of women susceptible of influence, impedes saving life
in other cases because it is precisely women in whose cases the
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prerequisites of an indication are absent and, beyond that, also
those who do not trust the result of a procedure to determine
an indication who will, in the face of the penal threat, carefully
keep the pregnancy secret and who to a large extent withdraw
themselves from helpful influence available through counseling
centers and surroundings. On the basis of such an analysis, there
could not be a defense of unborn life which was free of gaps.
The legislature, so this objection continues, would have no other
choice than to weigh off life against life, namely the life which
through a definite regulation of the abortion question could probably be saved against the life which would probably be sacrificed
on account of the same regulation, since the penal sanction would
not only protect but at the same time destroy unborn life. Thus,
since no solution would unequivocally better serve the protection
of the individual life, the legislature would not have transgressed
its constitutionally drawn boundaries with the regulation of
terms.
a) To begin with, this concept does not do justice to the
essence and the function of the penal law. The penal norm
directs itself fundamentally to all subjects of the law and obligates them in like manner. It is true that public prosecutors
practically never succeed in administering punishment to all
those who have broken the penal law. The unknown incidence
is variously high for the various offenses. It is uncontested that
the unknown incidence of acts of abortion is especially high. On
the other hand, the general preventive function of the penal law
ought not be forgotten. If one views as the task of the penal
law the protection of especially important legal values and elementary values of the community, a great importance accrues
to its function. Just as important as the observable reaction in
an individual case is the long range effect of a penal norm which
in its principal normative content ("abortion is punishable") has
existed for a very long time. No doubt, the mere existence of
such a penal sanction has influence on the conceptions of value
and the manner of behavior of the populace (cf. the report of
the Special Committee for the Penal Law Reform, Federal Parliamentary Press, 7/1981 new p. 10). The consciousness of legal
consequences which follows from its transgression creates a
threshold which many recoil from crossing. An opposite effect
will result if, through a general repeal of punishability, even
doubtlessly punishable behavior is declared to be legally free
from objection. This must confuse the concepts of "right" and
"wrong" dominant in the populace. The purely theoretical
announcement that the interruption of pregnancy is "tolerated,"
but not "approved," must remain without effect as long as no
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legal sanction is recognizable which clearly segregates the justified cases of abortion from the reprehensible. If the threat of
punishment disappears in its entirety, the impression will arise
of necessity in the consciousness of the citizens of the state that
in all cases the interruption of pregnancy is legally allowed and,
therefore, even from a socio-ethical point of view, is no longer
to be condemned. The "dangerous inference of moral permissibility from a legal absence of sanction" (Engisch, In the Quest
for Justice,M 1971, p. 104) is too near not to be drawn by a large
number of those subject to the law.
Also corresponding to this is the view of the Federal Government in the commentary to the draft of the statute introduced
in the sixth election period of the German Federal Parliament
(Federal Parliamentary Press, VI/3434, p. 9):
The term solution would lead to the disappearance of the
general awareness of the worthiness of protection of unborn life
during the first three months of pregnancy. It would lend support to the view that the interruption of pregnancy, in any case
in the early stage of pregnancy, is as subject to the unrestricted
right of disposition of the pregnant woman as the prevention
of pregnancy. Such a view is not compatible with the constitutional classification of values.
b) The weighing in bulk of life against life which leads to
the allowance of the destruction of a supposedly smaller number
in the interest of the preservation of an allegedly larger number
is not reconcilable with the obligation of an individual protection
of each single concrete life.
In the judicial opinions of the Federal Constitutional Court
the principle has been developed that the unconstitutionality of
a statutory provision, which in its structure and actual effect
prejudices a definite circle of persons, may not be refuted with
the showing that this provision or other regulations of the statute
favor another circle of persons. The emphasis of the general
tendency of the statute as a whole to favor legal protection is
even less adequate for this purpose. This principle (cf. Decisions
of the Federal Constitutional Court, 12, 151 168; 15, 328 333;
18, 97 108; 32, 260 269) is valid in special measure for the highest
personal legal value, "life." The protection of the individual life
may not be abandoned for the reason that a goal of saving other
lives, in itself worthy of respect, is pursued. Every human lifethe life first developing itself as well-is as such equally valuable
and can not therefore be subjected to a discriminatory evaluation, no matter how shaded, or indeed to a balancing on the basis
of statistics.
M. Title in German: "Auf der Suche nach der Gerechtigkeit."
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In the basic legal political conception of the Fifth Statute
to Reform the Penal Law a concept, which cannot be followed,
of the function of a constitutional statute is recognizable. The
legal protection for the concrete individual human life required
by the constitution is pushed into the background in favor of
a more "socio-technical" use of the statute as an intended action
of the legislature for the achievement of a definitely desired
socio-political goal, the "containing of the abortion epidemic."
The legislature may, however, not merely have a goal in view,
be it ever so worthy of pursuit; it must be aware that every
step on the way to the goal must be justified before the constitution and its indispensable postulates. The fundamental legal
protection in individual cases may not be sacrificed to the efficiency of the regulation as a whole. The statute is not only an
instrument to steer social processes according to sociological
judgments and prognoses but is also the enduring expression of
socio-ethical-and as a consequence-legal evaluation of human
acts; it should say what is right and wrong for the individual.
c) A dependable factual foundation is lacking for "a total
accounting"-which is to be rejected on principle. A sufficient
basis is lacking for the conclusion that the number of interruptions of pregnancy in the future will be significantly less than
with the previous statutory regulation. Rather, the representative of the government has come to the conclusion before the
Special Committee for Penal Law Reform (Seventh Election
Period, 25th Session, Stenographic Reports, p. 1451), on the basis
of detailed considerations and comparisons, that after the introduction of the regulation of terms into the Federal Republic a
40% increase of the total number of legal and illegal abortions
should be expected. This calculation, to be sure, was brought
into doubt by Professor Dr. Jurgens, who was heard in the oral
proceedings. The available statistics from other countries, however, especially from England after the Abortion Act of 1967
went into effect (cf. the statement in the report of the Committee
on the Working of the Abortion Act-Lane Report) and from
the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) after the
decreeing of the statute on the interruption of pregnancy of
March 9, 1972 (cf. Journal of German Physicians, 1974, p. 2765),
allow no certain conclusion that there will be a substantial
decline in abortions. Experiments, however, are not permissible
considering the great worth of the legal value to be protected.
The representatives of all parties in the Special Committee
for the Reform of the Penal Law, however, declined systematically to apply statistics regarding abortion from other countries
to the Federal German Republic (Seventh Election Period, 20th
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Session, Stenographic Reports, p. 1286 ff.). The effects of varying social structures, mentalities, religious affiliations and modes
of behavior hardly permit such calculations. Even if one takes
into account all of the peculiarities of the relationships in the
Federal Republic of Germany only in favor of the regulation of
terms, an increase in abortions is to be counted on because-as
shown-the mere existence of the penal norm of §218 of the
Penal Code has exerted influence on the value conceptions and
manner of behavior of the populace. It is important that as a
consequence of punishability the opportunity to obtain an abortion generally or indeed lege artis has up to this time been considerably limited (for, among other things, financial reasons).
That even a mere quantitive strengthening of the protection for
life could result from the term solution, is, in any case, not
evident.
3. The counseling and instruction of the pregnant woman
provided under §218c, Par. 1, of the Penal Code cannot, considered by itself, be viewed as suitable to effectuate a continuation
of the pregnancy.
The measures proposed in this provision fall short of the
concepts of the Alternative Draft of the 16 criminal law scholars,
upon which the conception of the Fifth Statute to Reform the
Penal Law is, after all, largely based. The counseling centers
provided for in §105, Par. 1, No. 2, of the Fifth Statute to Reform
the Penal Law should themselves have the means to afford financial, social, and family assistance. Furthermore, they shoula provide to the pregnant woman and her relatives emotional care
through suitable co-workers and work intensively for the continuation of the pregnancy (cf. for particulars, above, p. 11 ff.).
So to equip the counseling centers, in the sense of this or
similar suggestions, so that they are able to arrange direct assistance, would come much nearer the mark, since according to the
report of the Special Committee for the Reform of the Penal
Law (Printed Materials of the Federal Parliament, 7/1981, new,
p. 7, with evidentiary support from the hearings) the unfavorable
living situation, the impossibility of caring for a child while pursuing an education or working as well as economic need and
special material reasons, and, especially in the case of single
mothers, anxiety about social sanctions are supposed to be among
the most frequently given causes and motives for the desire for
the interruption of pregnancy.
On the other hand, the counseling centers will give instruction about "the public and private assistance available for pregnant women, mothers, and children," "especially regarding assistance which facilitates the continuation of the pregnancy and
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alleviates the situation of mother and child." This could be interpreted to mean that the counseling centers should only inform,
without exerting influence directed to the motivational process.
Whether the neutral description of the task of the counseling
centers may be attributed to the opinion advocated in the
Special Committee for the Reform of the Penal Law that the
pregnant woman should not be influenced in her decision
through the counseling (Representative von Schbler, FDP, Seventh Election Period, 25th Session, Stenographic Reports, p.
1473) can remain an open question. If a protective effect in favor
of developing life is to accrue to the counseling, it will depend,
in any case, decisively upon such an exertion of influence. Section 218c, Par. 1, Nos. 1 and 2, to be sure, allow the interpretation that counseling and instruction should motivate the pregnant woman to carry the pregnancy to term. The report of the
Special Committee is probably to be understood in this sense
(Printed Materials of the Federal Parliament, 7/1981 new, p. 16);
accordingly, the counseling should take into account the total circumstances of life of the pregnant woman and follow up personally and individually, not by telephone or by distributing printed
materials (cf. also the previously mentioned resolution of the
Federal Parliament, Printed Materials of the Federal Parliament,
7/2042).
Even if one might consider it thinkable that counseling of
this kind could exercise a definite effect in the sense of an aversion from the decision for abortion, its structure, in particular,
exhibits in any case deficiencies which do not allow the expectation of an effective protection of developing life.
a) The instruction about the public and private assistance
available for pregnant women, mothers and children, according
to §218c, Par. 1, No. 1, can also be undertaken by any physician.
Social law and social reality are, however, very difficult for the
technically trained person to comprehend. A reliable instruction
regarding the demands and possibilities in the individual case
cannot be expected from a physician, especially since individual
inquiries regarding need are frequently required (e.g., for assistance with rent or social assistance). Physicians are neither qualified for such counseling activity by their professional training
nor do they generally have the time required for individual
counseling.
b) It is especially questionable that the instruction about
social assistance can be undertaken by the same physician who
will perform the interruption of pregnancy. Through this provision the medical counseling under §218c, Par. 1, No. 2, which
itself falls within the realm of medical competence will be
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devalued. The counseling should be structured in conformity
with the views of the Special Committee for the Reform of the
Penal Law as follows:
Therefore, what is meant is counseling regarding the nature
of the operation and its possible consequences for health. That
the counseling may however not be limited to this purely medical aspect is emphasized through the conscious choice of the term
'by a physician'. Rather the counseling as far as possible and
appropriate must speak to the present and future total situation
of the pregnant woman to the extent that she can be affected
by the interruption of pregnancy and, at the same time, correspond to the other task of the physician, which is to work for
the protection of the unborn life. The physician must, therefore,
make it clear to the pregnant woman that human life is destroyed
by the operation and explain its stage of development. Experience shows, as confirmed in the public hearing, for example, by
Pross (AP, VI, p. 2255, 2256) and Rolinski (AP, VI, p. 2221)
that in this respect many women do not have clear ideas and
that this circumstance, if they later learn it, is frequently the
occasion for burdening doubts and questionings of conscience.
Accordingly, the counseling must be directed to preventing this
kind of conflict situation.
('Printed Materials of the Federal Parliament, 7/1981, new, p.
16)
An explanation, in the manner proposed here, which has the
required constitutional goal of working for a continuation of the
pregnancy cannot be expected from the physician who has been
sought out by the pregnant woman precisely for the purpose of
performing the interruption of pregnancy. Since, according to
the result of the previous inquiries and according to the position
statements of representative medical professional panels, it must
be assumed that the majority of physicians decline to perform
interruptions of pregnancy which are not indicated, only those
physicians will make themselves available who either see in the
interruption of pregnancy a money-making business or who are
inclined to comply with every wish of a woman for interruption
of pregnancy because they see in it merely a manifestation of
the right to self-determination or a means to the emancipation
of women. In both cases, an influence by the physician on the
pregnant woman for the continuation of the pregnancy is highly
improbable.
The experiences in England show this. There the indication
(very broadly conceived) must be determined by any two physicians of the patient's choosing. This has led to the result that
almost every desired abortion is carried out by private physicians
specializing in such activity. The appearance of professional
agents who guide women to these private clinics is an especially
unfortunate by-product which is very difficult to avoid (cf. Lane
Report, Vol. 1, No. 436 and 452).
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c) Furthermore, the prospects for success are poor since the
interruption of pregnancy can immediately follow the instruction
and counseling. A serious exchange with the pregnant woman
and others involved in which the arguments in the counseling
are contrasted with hers is not to be expected under these circumstances. The alternative formulation proposed by the Federal Ministry of Justice to the Special Committee for Penal Law
Reform for §218c provided as a consequence that the interruption
of pregnancy could first be performed after a minimum of three
days had elapsed after the instruction about available assistance
(§218, Par. 1, No. 1) (Special Committee, Seventh Election
Period, 30th Session, Stenographic Reports, p. 1659). In conformity with a report of the Special Committee, however, "a waiting period, enforced by the penal law, between the counseling
and the operation ... was rejected. This could in individual
cases bring with it unreasonable difficulties for the pregnant
woman according to her place of residence and her personal situation, with the consequence that the pregnant woman will dispense with the counseling." (Printed Materials of Federal Parliament, 7/1981 new, p. 17). For the woman decided upon an
interruption of pregnancy it is only necessary to find an obliging
physician. Since he may undertake the social as well as the
medical counseling and finally even carry out the operation, a
serious attempt to dissuade the pregnant woman from her
decision is not to be expected from him.
III.
In summary, the following observations should be made on
the constitutional adjudication of the regulation of terms encountered in the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law:
That interruptions of pregnancy are neither legally condemned nor subject to punishment is not -compatible with the
duty incumbent upon the legislature to protect life, if the interruptions are the result of reasons which are not recognized in
the value order of the Basic Law. Indeed, the limiting of punishability would not be constitutionally objectionable if it were
combined with other measures which would be able to compensate, at least in their effect, for the disappearance of penal protec-

tion. That is however-as shown-obviously not the case. The
parliamentary discussions about the reform of the abortion law

have indeed deepened the insight that it is the principal task of
the state to prevent the killing of unborn life through enlightenment about the prevention of pregnancy on the one hand as well

as through effective promotional measures in society and through
a general alteration of social concepts on the other. Neither the
assistance of the kind presently offered and guaranteed nor the
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counseling provided in the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal
Law are, however, able to replace the individual protection of
life which a penal norm fundamentally provides even today in
those cases in which no reason for the interruption of pregnancy
exists which is worthy of consideration according to the value
order of the Basic Law.
If the legislature regards the previously undifferentiated
threat of punishment for the interruption of pregnancy as a questionable means for the protection of life, it is not thereby released
from the obligation to undertake the attempt to achieve a better
protection of life through a differentiated penal regulation by
subjecting the same cases to punishment in which the interruption of pregnancy is to be condemned on constitutional grounds.
A clear distinction of this group of cases in contrast to other
cases in which the continuation of the pregnancy is not exactable
from the woman will strengthen the power of the penal norm
to develop a legal awareness. He who generally recognizes the
precedence of the protection of life over the claim of the woman
for an unrestricted structuring of her life will not be able to
dispute the unjust nature of the act in those cases not covered
by a particular indication. If the state not only declares that
these cases are punishable but also prosecutes and punishes them
in legal practice, this will be perceived in the legal consciousness
of the community neither as unjust nor as anti-social.
The passionate discussion of the abortion problematic may
provide occasion for the fear that in a segment of the population
the value of unborn life is no longer fully recognized. This, however, does not give the legislature a right to acquiesce. It rather
must make a sincere effort through a differentiation of the penal
sanction to achieve a more effective protection of life and formulate a regulation which will be supported by the general legal
consciousness.
IV.
The regulation encountered in the Fifth Statute to Reform
the Penal Law at times is defended with the argument that in
other democratic countries of the Western World in recent times
the penal provisions regulating the interruption of pregnancy
have been "liberalized" or "modernized" in a similar or an even
more extensive fashion; this would be, as the argument goes, an
indication that the new regulation corresponds, in any case, to
the general development of theories in this area and is not inconsistent with fundamental socio-ethical and legal principles.
These considerations cannot influence the decision to be
made here. Disregarding the fact that all of these foreign laws
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in their respective countries are sharply controverted, the legal
standards which are applicable there for the acts of the legislature are essentially different from those of the Federal Republic
of Germany.
Underlying the Basic Law are principles for the structuring
of the state that may be understood only in light of the historical experience and the spiritual-moral confrontation with the
previous system of National Socialism. In opposition to the
omnipotence of the totalitarian state which claimed for itself
limitless dominion over all areas of social life and which, in the
prosecution of its goals of state, consideration for the life of the
individual fundamentally meant nothing, the Basic Law of the
Federal Republic of Germany has erected an order bound together by values which places the individual human being and
his dignity at the focal point of all of its ordinances. At its basis
lies the concept, as the Federal Constitutional Court previously
pronounced (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, 2, 1
12), that human beings possess an inherent worth as individuals
in order of creation which uncompromisingly demands unconditional respect for the life of every individual human being, even
for the apparently socially "worthless," and which therefore
excludes the destruction of such life without legally justifiable
grounds. This fundamental constitutional decision determines
the structure and the interpretation of the entire legal order.
Even the legislature is bound by it; considerations of socio-political expediency, even necessities of state, cannot overcome this
constitutional limitation (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional
Court, 1, 14 36). Even a general change of the viewpoints dominant in the populace on this subject-if such a change could be
established at all-would change nothing. The Federal Constitutional Court, which is charged by the constitution with overseeing the observance of its fundamental principles by all organs
of the state and, if necessary, with giving them effect, can orient
its decisions only on those principles to the development of which
this Court has decisively contributed in its judicial utterances.
Therefore, no adverse judgment is being passed about other legal
orders "which have not had these experiences with a system
of injustice and which, on the basis of an historical development
which has taken a different course and other political conditions
and fundamental views of the philosophy of state, have not made
such a decision for themselves" (Decisions of the Federal Con'stitutional Court, 18, 112 117).
E.
On -thebasis of these considerations, §218a of the Penal Code
in the version of the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law
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is inconsistent with Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, in conjunction with Article 1, Paragraph 1, of the Basic Law to the
extent that it excepts interruption of pregnancy from punishability if no reasons are present which, according to the present
opinion, have standing under the ordering of values of the Basic
Law. Within this framework, the nullity of the provision is to
be determined. It is a matter for the legislature to distinguish
in greater detail the cases of indicated interruption of pregnancy
from those not indicated. In the interest of legal clarity, until
a valid statutory regulation goes into effect, it appeared necessary, under §35 of the Statute for 'the Federal Constitutional
Court, to issue a directive, the contents of which are obvious from
the tenor of this judgment.
There is no occasion to declare further provisions of the Fifth
Statute to Reform the Penal Law to be invalid.
Dr. Benda
Ritterspach
Rupp-von Briinneck
Dr. B6hmer
Dr. Brox

Dr. Haager
Dr. Faller
Dr. Simon

Dissenting Opinion
Of Justice Rupp von Briinneck and Justice Dr. Simon to the
judgment of February 25, 1975, of the First Senate of the Federal
Constitutional Court,
-l F.C.C. 1/74
-1 F.C.C. 2/74
-l F.C.C. 3/74
-l F.C.C. 4/74
-1 F.C.C. 5/74
-1 F.C.C. 6/74
The life of each individual human being is self-evidently a
central value of the legal order. It is uncontested that the constitutional duty to protect this life also includes its preliminary
stages before birth. The debates in Parliament and before the
Federal Constitutional Court dealt not with the whether but
rather only the how of this protection. This decision is a matter
of legislative responsibility. Under no circumstances can the
duty of the state to prescribe punishment for abortion in every
stage of pregnancy be derived from the constitution. The legislature should be able to determine the regulations for counseling
and the term solution as well as for the indications solution.
A contrary construction of the constitution is not compatible
with the liberal character of the fundamental legal norms and
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shifts the competence to decide, to a material extent, onto the
Federal Constitutional Court (A). In the judgment on the Fifth
Statute to Reform the Penal Law, the majority neglects the
uniqueness of abortion in relation to other risks of life
(B.I.1. = p. 671 et seq.). It insufficiently appreciates the social
problematic previously found by the legislature as well as the
aims of urgent reform (B.I.2. = p. 673 et seq.). Because each solution remains patchwork, it is not constitutionally objectionable
that the German legislature-in consonance with the reforms in
other western civilized states (B.III. = p. 683 et seq.)-has given
priority to social-political measures over largely ineffective penal
sanctions (B.I.3.-5. = p. 675 et seq.). The constitution nowhere
requires a legal "condemnation" of behavior not morally respectable without consideration of its actual protective effect (B.II.
= p. 681 et seq.).

A.-I.
The authority of the Federal Constitutional Court to annul
the decisions of the legislature demands sparing use, if an
imbalance between the constitutional organs is to be avoided.
The requirement of judicial self-restraint, which is designated as
the "elixer of life" of the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court,' is especially valid when involved is not a defense
from overreaching by state power but rather the making, via
constitutional judicial control, of provisions for the positive
structuring of the social order for the legislature which is directly
legitimitized by the people. The Federal Constitutional Court
must not succumb to the temptation to take over for itself the
function of a controlling organ and shall not in the long run
endanger the authority to judicially review constitutionality.
1. The test proposed in this proceeding departs from the
basis of classical judicial control. The fundamental legal norms
standing in the central part of our constitution guarantee as
rights of defense to the citizen in relation to the state a sphere
of unrestricted structuring of one's life based on personal
responsibility. The classical function of the Federal Constitutional Court lies in defending against injuries to this sphere of
freedom from excessive infringement by the state power. On
the scale of possible infringements by the state, penal provisions
are foremost: they demand of a citizen a definite behavior and
subdue him in the case of a violation with grievious restrictions
of freedom or with financial burdens. Judicial control of the
constitutionality of such provisions therefore means a determina1. Leibholz, VVD St RL 20 (1963), p. 119.
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tion whether the encroachment resulting either from the enactment or application of penal provisions into protected spheres
of freedom is allowable; whether, therefore, the state, generally
or to the extent provided, may punish.
In the present constitutional dispute, the inverse question is
presented for the first time for examination, namely whether the
state must punish, whether the abolition of punishment for the
interruption of pregnancy in the first three months of pregnancy
is compatible with fundamental rights. It is obvious, however,
that the disregard of punishment is the opposite of state enchroachment. Since the partial withdrawal of the penal provision did not occur to benefit interruptions of pregnancies but
rather, because the previous penal sanction, according to the
unrefuted assumption of the legislature which has been confirmed by experience, has thoroughly proved itself ineffective,
an "attack" on the unborn life by the state is not even indirectly
construable. Because no such infringement exists, the Austrian
Constitutional Court has denied that the regulation of terms
there violates the catalog of fundamental rights recognized by
2
the law of Austria.
2. Since the fundamental rights as defense rights are from
the beginning not suitable to prevent the legislature from eliminating penal provisions, the majority of this Court seeks to find
the basis for this in the more extensive meaning of fundamental
rights as objective value decisions.3 According to this, the fundamental rights not only establish rights of defense of the individual against the state, but also contain at the same time
objective value decisions, the realization of which through affirmative action is a permanent task of state power. This idea
has been developed by the Federal Constitutional Court in the
laudable endeavor to lend greater effectiveness to the fundamental rights in their capacity to secure freedom and to strive for
social justice. The majority of this Court insufficiently considers
differences in the two aspects of fundamental rights, differences
essential to the judicial control of constitutionality.
As defense rights the fundamental rights have a comparatively clear recognizable content; in their interpretation and
application, the judicial opinions have developed practicable,
generally recognized criteria for the control of state encroachments-for example, the principle of proportionality. On the
other hand, it is regularly a most complex question, how a value
decision is to be realized through affirmative measures of the
2. Cf. the Judgment of October 11, 1974 - G 8/74 - II.2.b, Reasons for
the decision, European Journal for Fundamental Rights, 1975, p. 74 (76).
3. C.I3. and C.III.2.b. of the Judgment (pp. 641 et seq., 646 et seq.).
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legislature. The necessarily generally held value decisions can
be perhaps characterized as constitutional mandates which, to be
sure, are assigned to point the direction for all state dealings
but are directed necessarily toward a transposition of binding
regulations. Based upon the determination of the actual circumstances, of the concrete setting of goals and their priority and
of the suitability of conceivable means and ways, very different
solutions are possible. The decision, which frequently presupposes compromises and takes place in the course of trial and
error, belongs, according to the principle of division of powers
of the legisand to the democratic principle, to the responsibility
4
lature directly legitimatized by the people.
Certainly, because of the growing importance of promoting
social measures to effectuate fundamental rights even in this
area, every judicial control of constitutionality cannot be renounced; the development of a suitable instrument which
respects the freedom of the legislature to structure will probably
be among the main tasks of judicial decision making in the next
decades. As long as such an instrument is lacking, the danger
exists that judicial control of constitutionality will not limit
itself to reviewing decisions of the legislature but rather will
substitute another decision which the Court determines to be better. This danger will exist in a heightened degree, when-as here
-in sharply controversial questions a decision made by the
parliamentary majority after long debate is challenged before the
Federal Constitutional Court by the defeated minority. Without
prejudice to the legitimate authority of those entitled to petition
the Court to resolve constitutional doubt in this manner, the
Federal Constitutional Court is unwarily falling in this case into
the position of a political arbitration board to be used for the
choice between competing legislative projects.
The idea of objective value decisions should however not
become a vehicle to shift specifically legislative functions in the
formation of social order onto the Federal Constitutional Court.
Otherwise the Court will be forced into a role for which it is
neither competent nor equipped. Therefore, the Federal Constitutional Court should maintain the restraint which it exercised
prior to the High School-Decision (cf. Decisions of the Federal
Constitutional Court, 4, 7 [18]; 27, 253 [283]; 33, 303 [333 f.];
35, 148-dissenting opinion-[152 ff.]; 36, 321 [330 ff.]). This
Court should confront the legislature only when the latter has
completely disregarded a value decision or when the nature and
manner of its realization is obviously faulty. On the other hand,
4. Cf. in this regard for more particulars our dissenting opinion in

the High School Judgment, Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court,
35, 148 (150, 153, 155 f.).
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in spite of supposed acknowledgement of legislative freedom to
structure, the majority effectively charges the legislature with
not realizing a recognized value decision in, according to the
majority's view, the best manner possible. Should this become
the general standard for judicial examination, the requirement
of judicial self-restraint would accordingly be sacrificed.
II.
1. Our strongest reservation is directed to the fact that for
first
time in opinions of the Constitutional Court an objective
the
value decision should function as a duty of the legislature to
enact penal norms, therefore to postulate the strongest conceivable encroachment into the sphere of freedom of the citizen.
This inverts the function of the fundamental rights into its
contrary. If the objective value decision contained in a fundamental legal norm to protect a certain legal value should suffice
to derive therefrom the duty to punish, the fundamental rights
could underhandedly, on the pretext of securing freedom, become
the basis for an abundance of regimentations which restrict freedom. What is valid for the protection of life can also be claimed
for other legal values of high rank-for example, inviolability
of the body, freedom, marriage, and family.
Quite obviously the constitution presupposes that the state
can also resort to its power to punish to protect an orderly social
life; the thrust of fundamental rights, however, does not go to
the promotion of such a utilization but rather to the drawing
of its boundaries. In this way the Supreme Court of the United
States has even regarded punishment for the interruption of
pregnancy, performed by a physician with the consent of the
pregnant woman in the first third of pregnancy, as a violation
of fundamental rights.5 This would, according to German constitutional law, go too far indeed. According to the liberal character of our constitution, however, the legislature needs a
constitutional justification to punish, not to disregard punishment, because, according to its view, a threat of punishment
promises no success or appears for other reasons to be an
improper reaction (cf. Decisions of the Federal Constitutional
Court, 22, 49 [78]; 27, 18 [28]; 32, 40 [48]).
The opposite interpretation of fundamental rights necessarily
leads to an extension of judicial control of constitutionality
which is subject to equal if not more doubt: it is no longer necessary merely to determine alone whether a penal provision
encroaches too far into the sphere of rights of the citizens, but
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) - 93 S. Ct. 705 - 41 U.S. Law
Week 4213.
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also the inverse, whether the state punishes too little. Therefore the Federal Constitutional Court will, contrary to the
majority opinion,6 not be able to restrict itself to the question
whether the enactment of any particular penal norm regardless
of its contents is required, but in addition must clarify which
penal sanction suffices for the protection of the respective legal
value. In the last consequence the Court may find it necessary
to determine whether the application of a penal norm in the
individual case satisfies the concept of protection.
A constitutional determination of penal norms-as the majority requires-is ultimately to be rejected, precisely because
the guiding ideas concerning penal law, according to the experiences of the last decades and the expected developments in the
field of social sciences, are subject to quick and powerful change.
This shows not only a picture of fundamental changes in perhaps the judgments concerning moral offenses-e.g., homosexuality, wife-pandering, exhibitionism-, but also covers in a special
way the penal provisions against abortion. The freedom from
punishment for ethically (criminologically) indicated abortion,
which today corresponds to the predominant legal view, was still
sharply debated in the sixties. 7 The drafts of a penal code submitted by the federal government in 1960 and 1962 expressly
rejected this indication; 8 for the social and eugenic indications
they were content with the reference that the rejection was "self-

explanatory."9
2. Even the history of the origins of the Basic Law speaks
against deriving a duty to punish from norms of fundamental
rights. Where the Parliamentary Council deemed penal sanctions to be constitutionally required, it expressly incorporated
them in the Basic Law: Article 26, Paragraph 1, for the preparation for aggressive warfare and Article 143, in the original draft,
for high treason.
On the other hand, in the materials of Article 2, Paragraph
2, of the Basic Law, as the majority concedes,' 0 no bases are
to be found for a duty to protect unborn life with penal laws.
6. D.I. (p. 649).
7. Cf. the debates in the Federal Council and Federal Parliament
(Notes of the 254th Session of the Legal Committee of the Federal Council of June 26, 1963, p. 30 ff.; Proceedings of the Federal Council, 1962,
p. 140 f., 173, 154 f.; Proceedings of the German Parliament, Fourth Election Period, Stenographic Reports of the 70th Session of March 28, 1963,
p. 3188, 3208, 3210, 3217, 3221); see further information in Lang-Hinrichsen, Jurists Journal, 1963, p.725 ff.
8. Cf. Sections 140 f., 157 and the reasoning, Printed Materials of the
Federal Parliament, 111/2150, p. 262, 274 f.; Printed Materials of the Federal Parliament, IV/650, p. 278, 292 f.
9. Printed Materials of the Federal Parliament, IH/2150, p. 262,
IV/650, p. 278.
10. C.I.I.d. (pp. 639 et seq.).
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A closer analysis of the history of the origins of the article shows,
moreover, that the penal evaluation of the interruption of pregnancy should be left consciously to the responsible decision of
the legislature alone. The statements of Representatives Heuss
and Greive, which are important to that extent, and the defeat
of the motion of Representative Seebohm" must be understood
in their historical context. During the Weimar period, punishment of abortion was extraordinarily debated; involved at that
time was an incomparably more serious problem, because the
widespread and easily applicable means of contraception of today
were not yet in existence. This situation continued unchanged
to the time of the Parliamentary Council. If under these circumstances the proposed incorporation of an express provision
for the protection of germinating life was rejected, this, in conjunction with the aforementioned statement, is to be understood
only in the sense that the reform of the controversial §218 of
the Penal Code should not be prejudiced by the constitution.
A contrary standpoint cannot be supported with the argument that the reception of Article 2, Paragraph 2, of the Basic
Law unquestionably originated from the reaction to the inhumane ideology and practice of the National Socialist regime. 12
This reaction refers to the mass destruction of human life by
the state in concentration camps and, in the case of the mentally
ill, sterilizations and forced abortions directed by authorities, to
involuntary medical experiments on human beings, to disrespect
of individual life and human dignity which was expressed by
countless other measures of state.
Drawing conclusions concerning the constitutional assessment of the killing of a child en ventre sa mere by the pregnant
woman herself or by a third party with her consent is less pertinent than drawing conclusions from such a killing by the state,
as, for example, by the Nazi regime which had taken up a rigorous standpoint corresponding to its biologically oriented ideology
towards population. Alongside of new provisions against advertising for abortions or abortion methods, a stricter application
of penal provisions was worked out through corresponding state
measures in contrast to the Weimar period. 1 3 This penal sanction which was already severe was significantly sharpened in
1943. Until that time only imprisonment was provided for the
pregnant woman and her non-professional helper; by this time,
11. C.I.l.d. (pp. 639 et seq.) with the sources indicated there.

12. Cf., however, C.I.l.a. and D.IV. of this Judgment (p. 637, pp. 661

et seq.).

13. Cf. The rise of sentencings in the Third Reich: Dotzauer, Abortion, in Handbook of Criminology (Ed. von Sieverts), 2nd Ed., Vol. 1
(1966), p. 10 f. (In German, the title is Handworterbuch der Kriminolo-

gie-Trans.).
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however, self-abortion, in especially aggravated cases, was
punished with imprisonment in the penitentiary. The professional abortion was, apart from less serious cases, always
punished with imprisonment in the penitentiary; and, even with
the death penalty, if the perpetrator had "thereby continually
injured the vitality of the German people." In the face of these
provisions, which remained unchanged when the Basic Law was
adopted and was mitigated solely through the Allied prohibition
of cruel or excessively severe punishments, the reasons which
led to the adoption of Article 2, Paragraph 2, of the Basic Law
can by no means be adduced in favor of a constitutional duty
to punish abortions. Rather, the decisive renunciation completed
with the Basic Law of the totalitarian National Socialist state
demands rather the reverse conclusion, that is, restraint in
employing criminal punishment, the improper use of which in
the history of mankind has caused endless suffering.
B.
Even if one, contrary to our position, agrees with the
majority that a constitutional duty to punish is conceivable, no
constitutional violation can be charged to the legislature. Although it is not necessary to go into every detail, the majority
reasoning encounters the following objections:
I.
Even according to the opinion of the majority a constitutional duty to punish should only come into consideration
as ultima ratio.14 If one considers this seriously, such a duty
immediately presupposed that suitable means of a milder form
are not available or that their employment has proved to be
ineffective; moreover, the penal sanction must be suitable and
required to achieve the desired goal at all or more effectively.
Both must-if one follows the previous decisions (cf., e.g., Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, 17, 306 [313 f.])-be proved beyond doubt. Since the allowance of an existing
penal provision depends on whether it is suitable and required
for the protection of the respective legal value, such proof is
needed even when the legislature is compelled to punish even
against its will. In its adjudication of the factual basis and the
effectiveness of the intended measures, the Court must accept
as a basis the view of the legislature so long as it has not been
refuted as obviously erroneous (cf. Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, 7, 377 [412]; 24, 367 [406]; 35, 148-dissenting
opinion-[165]).
14. C.III.2.b. (pp. 646 et seq.).
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The reasoning of the judgment does not satisfy these requirements. It is repeatedly entangled with contradictions and in the
end directly shifts the burden of proof: the legislature shall be
allowed to forgo penal sanction, only when it is established without doubt that the milder measures favored by it to fulfill the
duty of protection are "at least" equally effective or more effective.15
1. The immediately impressive statements .about the undisputed high rank of the protection of life neglect the uniqueness
of the interruption of pregnancy in relation to other dangers of
human life. Involved here is not the academic question of
whether it is proper to employ the power of the state to protect
against murderers and killers, who can be deterred in no other
way. In the European legal history, which has been influenced
by the Church, a distinction has been constantly made between
born and unborn life. Even the value decision of the constitution
leaves room for such a differentiation in the choice of measures
of protection precisely because the fundamental right of Article
2, Paragraph 2, of the Basic Law is not-as the majority formulates' 6 -"comprehensively" guaranteed, but rather is subject to
statutory restriction. Otherwise neither the ethical nor the
eugenic or even the social indications could be established.
Even the majority does not question the authority for this
distinction, 7 but does not distinguish, once again, between the
different aspects of fundamental legal norms. Where the defense
against state encroachments is involved, a distinction cannot, of
course, be made between prenatal and postnatal stages of
development; the embryo is, insofar as it is a potential bearer
of fundamental rights, to be protected without exception in the
same way as each born human life. This equal treatment under
the law has only limited applicability to the injury to unborn
life by a third party against the will of the pregnant woman,
in no way however can it be applied to the refusal of the
woman to allow the child en ventre sa mere to become a human
being.
The unusual circumstances that in the person of the pregnant woman there is a unique unity of "actor" and "victim" is
of legal significance, i" because much more is demanded of the
pregnant woman than mere omission-as opposed to the demands
on the one addressed by penal provisions against homicide: she
15. D.III., C.III.3. (pp. 660 et seq., 647 et seq.); cf. D.II.2.c. (pp. 656 et
seq.).
16. C.I.1. (p. 642).
17. C.II.2.a. (pp. 645 et seq.).

18. The majority concurs, see C.II.2., C.III.3. (pp. 642 et seq., 647 et
seq.).
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must not only tolerate the far-reaching changes in her health
and well-being associated with carrying the child en ventre sa
mere to term, but also submit to encroachments upon her way
of life which result from pregnancy and birth, and especially
accept the maternal responsibility for the further development
of the child after birth. Otherwise than in the case of homicide
mentioned, the legislature can and must proceed, furthermore,
from the idea that the object of protection-the child en ventre
sa mere-is most effectively protected by the mother herself
and that her willingness to carry the child en ventre sa mere
to term can be strengthened through measures of the most varied
kinds. Since no penal provision is required by nature to produce
and secure the maternally protective relationship, the question
arises whether a disturbance of this relationship, as is evident in
the case of interruptions of pregnancy, can be obviated directly
through a penal sanction in an appropriate manner. In any case
the legislature may, because of the special circumstances mentioned, react differently here than to the killing of human life
by a third party.
According to the view of the undersigned Madame Justice,
the refusal of the pregnant woman to permit the child en ventre
sa mere to become a human being is something essentially different from the killing of independently existing life, not only
according to the natural sensitivities of the woman but also
legally. For this reason the equating in principle of abortion
in the first stage of pregnancy with murder or intentional killing is not allowable from the outset. Firstly, it is mistaken, if
not irrelevant, to relate the term solution to euthanasia or even
the "killing of unworthy life" in order to distinguish it therefrom, as has occurred in the public discussion. The fact that
an independently existing living being separable from the maternal organism first exists after a lengthy process of development
rather suggests or at least permits with regard to legal judgment
consideration of lines of demarcation based on time, which correspond to this development. 19 The biological continuity of the
entire development until birth 2 0-the beginning of which is to
be set, not at implantation, but rather at conception, if the
majority view is consistently applied-does not alter the fact that
a change in the attitude of the pregnant woman, in the sense
of a growing maternal relationship, corresponds to the different
19. Cf. the Judgment of the Austrian Constitutional Court under

II.5.b. of the Reasoning of the Decision, European Journal for Fundamen-

tal Rights 1975, p. 74 (80); Lay, Juristic Journal 1970, p. 465 ff.; going
even further, Roman Herzog (JR 1969, p. 441) designates it as a matter
for the legislature to determine "from which stage of development on
the protection of the state shall become effective."
20. See C.I.l.b. (p. 638).
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embryonic stages of development. Accordingly, for the legal consciousness of the pregnant woman as well as for the general legal
consciousness, there is a difference between an interruption of
pregnancy which takes place in the first stage of pregnancy and
one which takes place in a later phase. This has resulted at all
times in domestic and foreign legal systems in a different penal
assessment which is tied to such stages which are based on time,
as, for example, the Supreme Court of the United States
impressively stated. 21 Regarding German law, it deserves
emphasis that canon law, based on the theory of ensoulment, considered until the end of the nineteenth century abortions performed up to the 80th day after conception to be free from
punishment; even secular penal law had established, until the
Enactment of the Penal Code of 1871, temporal stages as a basis
22
for the degree of punishment.

The undersigned Justice is inclined from a legal standpoint
to attribute less significance to these further considerations about
the relationship between the pregnant woman and her child en
ventre sa mere. If however the repeal of the penal sanction during the first three months of pregnancy is not constitutionally
objectionable on other grounds-those already mentioned or to
be discussed later-then the legislature does not in any case act
in ignorance when it takes account in it regulation of the
circumstances mentioned.
2. The examination whether, despite the aforementioned
special circumstances, a duty to punish in order to protect unborn
life is to be required as ultima ratio must proceed from the
social problem, which provided the occasion for the legislature to pass this regulation. In the reasoning of the majority,
one finds only slight allusion to the complexity of this problem
and-in connection with the regulation of indications-some discussion about the social causes of abortion; 23 as a whole, however, because of the more dogmatic manner of consideration,
there was insufficient appreciation, for a reform which was
recognized on all sides as necessary, of the conditions found by
the legislature and of the difficulties flowing therefrom.
a) These conditions are in the first place complicated by
the enormous number of illegal abortions, which cannot be dis21. 410 U.S. 113 (132 ff., 160 f.).
22. Cf. Dihn in: "The Proscription of Abortion in Section 218 of the
Penal Code (Ed. von Baumann), 2d Edition, 1972, p. 331 f.; Supreme
Court, loc. cit., 134; Simpson-Geerds, Criminal Acts against the Person
and Moral Offenses from the Perspective of Comparative Law, 1969, p.
87; Special Committee for Penal Law Reform, Seventh Election Period,
Outline of the 15th Session, Stenographic Reports, p. 690 ff., 697 f.
23. C., C.III.2, C.III.3, D.II., D.II.3., (pp. 637 et seq., 645 et seq., 647 et

seq., 650 et seq., 657 et seq.).
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missed by the fact that-understandably-no certain data can.
be obtained. According to the reports of the Special Committee
for Penal Law Reform, there are, "according to investigations
which are to be taken seriously," from 75,000 to 300,000 illegal
abortions annually; 24 the figures mentioned by the experts at
the public hearing before the Special Committee also fluctuated
within this range. 25 Until recently, i.e., until the beginning of
discussions in Parliament, much higher figures were generally
26
assumed.
Even if one takes only the lowest estimates as a basis, the
number remains shockingly high. In contrast, there is a negligible number of abortion cases which have become known to
authorities and judicially condemned: in 1971 there were 584
known penal offenses and 184 convictions; in 1972, 476 cases, 154
convictions.2 1 In the great preponderance of these, the sentence
was only a monetary fine; the exceptionally imposed short term
incarceration was usually suspended for probation. 28 The failure to observe the penal provision recognized herein does not
by itself signify a depreciation of developing life, but rather has
a detrimental effect on the general validity of law, especially
since under these circumstances prosecution becomes pure
chance.
Furthermore, the legislature cannot be indifferent to the fact
that illegal interruptions of pregnancy lead even today to injuries
of health; and this is true not only in the case of abortions by
"quacks" and "angel-makers," but also, to a greater extent, in the
case of procedures undertaken by physicians because illegality
discourages the full use of modern equipment and assistance of
the required personnel or hinders the necessary follow-up treatment. Further, the commercial exploitation of women inclined
to an abortion in Germany and in foreign countries and the
social inequality connected with it appears as a drawback; better
situated women can, especially by traveling to neighboring
foreign countries, much more easily obtain an abortion by a
physician than poorer or less clever ones. Finally, -the resulting
possibility of subsequent criminality must be added to this; thus
24. Cf. Printed Materials of the Federal Parliament 7/1981 (new) p.
6; 7/1982, p. 5; 7/1983 p. 5, each with further sources.
25. Cf. Special Committee for Penal Law Reform, Sixth Election Period, 74, 75 and 76th Session, Stenographic Reports, p. 2173, 2218, 2241.

26. Cf. the evidence in the answer of the Federal Minister of Justice
to the small interrogation of the faction of the CDU/CSU, Printed
Materials of the Federal Parliament, VI/2025, p. 3; see also E.W. B6ckenfirde, who established the basis of the 200,000 to 400,000 illegal abortions,
(Voice of the Time) Vol. 188, (1971), p. 147 [152]).
27. Statistical Yearbook for the Federal Republic of Germany, 1973,
p. 117, 121; 1974, p. 116, 121.
28. Cf. Federal Office of Statistics, Speciality Series A, "Populace and

Culture", Row 9, "Care of the Law", 1972, p. 100 f., 144 f., 160 f.
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extortion with the knowledge of an illegal abortion stands in
29
third place among the types of extortion.
b) It was especially significant for the legislature in deciding how best to reform these situations that the decision for an
abortion generally grows out of a conflict situation based on
varied motivations which are strongly imprinted with the circumstances of the individual case. In addition to economic or
material reasons-for example, inadequate living conditions,
insufficient or uncertain income for a perhaps already large
family, the necessity for both spouses to be employed-stand personal reasons: the social discrimination against unwed mothers,
which continues to exist, the pressure of the father or the family,
fear of endangering the relationship with the partner or of strife
with parents, the desire or the necessity of continuing education
already begun, or of continuing to practice a profession, difficulties in marriage, the feeling of not being physically or emotionally equal to the care and control of more children, and with
singles, also the unwillingness to educate the child at home in an
irresponsible way. The anxiety of the pregnant woman that the
unwanted pregnancy would lead to a rupture in her personal
life-style or in the standard of living of the family, the perception
that in bearing the child en ventre sa mere she could not count
on effective help from the world about her, but must meet alone
the adverse consequences of behavior for which she alone is not
accountable, often make interruption of pregnancy appear to be
the only way out for her. Even when in the individual situation
the imprudent motivations of comfort, of egotism, and especially
of consumer aspiration are in the foreground, the burden cannot
rest exclusively with the woman, but reflects at the same time
the widespread materialistic and child-hating attitude of the
"affluent society." Also neither the state nor society have
developed up to this time sufficient institutions and life-styles
which would enable the woman to combine motherhood and
family life with personal development of equal opportunity,
particularly in the professional area. 30
3.

In this whole situation, "the containing of the abortion

29. Geerds, Extortion, in Handbook of Criminology, loc. cit., p. 182.
30. Cf. with all of this, e.g. the Memorandum of the Bensberger Circle
to Reform Section 218 of the Penal Code (Special Printing of the Public
Forum) under 1.1. as well as the Statements of the experts and the representatives of the Government before the Special Committee for Penal
Law Reform, Sixth Election Period, 74, 75 and 76th Session, Stenographic
Reports, p. 2219, with tabulated overview in Appendix 3, p. 2368 (Rolinski); p. 2233 (Dotzauer); p. 2251 ff. (Pross); Seventh Election Period,
see further the Reports of
23rd Session, Stenographic Reports, p. 1390 f.;
the Special Committee for Penal Law Reform, Printed Materials of the
Federal Parliament, 7/1981, (new) p. 7; 7/1982, p. 7; 7/1983, p. 7; 7/1984,

(new) p. 5.
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epidemic" is not only a "goal desired socially and politically,"'
but also is urgently required precisely for a better protection
of life and to restore the credibility of the legal order. In striving toward the solution of this most difficult problem the legislature has exhaustively evaluated all essential points of view.
The reform of §218 of the Penal Code has, for some time now,
thoroughly occupied a public deeply split on the issue. Against
this background, the parliamentary deliberations were carried
out with great seriousness and uncommon thoroughness. Express reference was made to the value decisions of the constitution; unanimity existed about the state's duty to protect unborn
life. In ascertaining the authoritative factors and arguments for
a sound decision, the proceeding of the legislative bodies corresponded totally to that which the decision on the Communist
Party of Germany held to be characteristic of a legitimate formation of a popular mandate in a liberal democratic state (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, 5, 85 135, 197 f.).
In the solution chosen the legislature was within its authority to proceed on the assumption that, in view of the failure of
the penal sanction, the suitable means toward a remedy are to
be sought in the social and community realm and that involved
is, on the one hand, facilitating the bearing of the child to term
by the mother through preventive psychological, social, and
social-politicalpromotional measures and strengthening her willingness to this end; and, on the other hand, decreasing the
number of unwanted pregnancies through better information
about the possibilities for preventing conception. Even the
majority3 2 does not apparently doubt that such measures seen
as a whole are the most effective and are in accord with the
earliest effectuation of fundamental rights in the sense of greater
freedom and increased social justice.
Promotional measures of this kind can, of course, because
of the differing competencies of the state, be enacted only
partially in a penal code. The Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal
Law contains consequently merely a duty to consult. According
to the conception of the legislature the pregnant woman shall
thus-without fear of punishment-be brought out of her isolation; the surmounting of her difficulties shall be facilitated by
open contacts with her environment and by an individual counseling addressed to her personal conflict situation. That the consultation provided should serve the protection of developing life,
since it awakens and strengthens the willingness to carry the
child en ventre sa mere to term where important reasons are
31. D.II.2.b. (pp. 655 et seq.).

32. C.III.l., D.II., D.III. (pp. 644 et seq., 650 et seq., 660 et seq.).
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not in opposition, follows directly from the statutory materials

of the
cited in the reasoning for the judgment and the decision
33
majority of the Federal Parliament mentioned there.
We do not dispute that this counseling regulation-as explained in the judgment 34 -still displays weaknesses. To the
extent that these weaknesses could not have been removed by
a construction of the statute which conforms to the constitution and by a corresponding implementation of regulations
of federal states, a constitutional objection would have to
be limited solely to these shortcomings and may not challenge
the regulation of terms and counseling in their fundamental conception. Furthermore, the success of the counseling regulation
depends essentially on whether help can be offered to or
arranged for the pregnant woman which opens for her ways out
of her difficulties. If this fails, even the penal law is nothing
other than an alibi for the deficit of effective help; the responsibility and the burdens would be shifted onto the weakest members of society. The majority-in agreement with previous
judicial opinions-finds itself unable to limit the freedom of
formulation of the legislature and prescribes for it an expansion
of the social-preventive measures.3 5 If, however, judicial selfrestraint has validity, the Constitutional Court a fortiori should
not compel the legislature to employ the power of punishment,
which is the strongest means of state coercion, to compensate
for the social neglect of duty3 6 with the threat of punishment.
This certainly does not correspond to the function of penal law
in a liberal social state.
4. Even the majority recognizes the legislative intention 3to
7
preserve life through counseling as a "goal worthy of respect",
but holds in agreement with the petitioners the ordering of flanking penal sanctions to be unalterable because comprehensive forgoing of punishment leaves a "gap in protection" in the cases
in which the interruption of pregnancy is based on reasons which
are in no way worthy of respect.38
a) The ability of penal sanctions to protect life as intended,
however, immediately appears to be doubtful. Even the major33. A.I.6.d., D.II., D.II.3., D.II.3.b. (pp. 619 et seq., 650 et seq., 657 et
seq., 658 et seq.); see further the Statements of representatives of the
Government and representatives in the Second and Third Deliberation

(Rep. de With, Mrs. Funcke, Mrs. Eilers, Dr. Eppler, Scheu, Federal Min-

ister Mrs. Dr. Focke and Federal Chancellor Brandt), 95th Session, Stenographic Reports, p. 6383 [D]; 6384 [A]; 6391 [A); 6402 [B]; 96th Session,
Stenographic Reports, p. 6471 [B]; 6482 [B]; 6499; 6500 ['B].
34. D.II.3. (pp. 657 et seq.).
35. C.I1.1. (pp. 644 et seq.).
36. Cf. in this regard Rudolphi, Penal Acts against the Developing
Life, ZStrW 83 (1971), p. 105, 114 f., 128 f., 134.
37. D.II.2.b., D.II.1. (pp. 655 et seq., 651 et seq.).
38. A.II.2.c., C.III.2.b., D.1I.2. (pp. 625 et seq., 646 et seq., 653 et seq.).
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ity concedes that the previous general punishability of abortion
has not sufficiently protected developing life and possibly has
even contributed to the neglect of other effective measures of
protection. 39 It believes-even if it is not completely sure of
it 4 0-that this forgoing of protection by punishment would be
remedied through a differentiated threat of punishment, according to which interruption of pregnancy should remain without
punishment in the cases in which there are indications and which
were discussed in the legislative proceedings. Regarding the previously recognized or practiced medical, ethical, and eugenic indication, this indications solution certainly brings no essential
alteration of the previously existing unsatisfactory state of the
law. An actual difference exists only in the recognition of the
social indication, so far as the legislature does not proceed in an
excessively strict manner with respect to the limitation incumbent upon it and, at least here, observes the correlation mentioned between social help due and justifiable punishment: the
less the state, for its part, is able to help, the more questionable
and, at the same time, the less effective are the threats of punishment against women who, for their part, do not feel equal to
the duty of bearing the child en ventre sa mere to term.
The matters considered by the majority which as a whole
favor the indications solution certainly deserve attention from
the standpoint of legal policy. It is, however, constitutionally
decisive that, upon realistic consideration, protection of life without gaps cannot be achieved even with differing penal sanctions
and therefore no solution can be "constitutionally required."
The majority still owes the explanation incumbent upon it of
how, in the era of "abortion-tourism," domestic penal provisions
will directly and favorably influence those women who are
decided upon abortion for imprudent reasons. Such a success
is possible, if at all, only in a certain number of cases-especially
with those belonging to socially weaker groups. With women
subject to influence the ambivalent effect of penal threats is
shown inter alia by the fact that, on the one hand, penal threats
might offer support against the abortion demands of the father
or of the family, but, on the other hand, can contribute to an
increase in abortions by driving the pregnant woman into isolation, thereby exposing her more than ever to such pressures
and occasioning short-circuited treatment.
b) However the protective effect of penal sanctions may be
judged, its partial revocation is, in any case, based on considerations which from the point of view of protecting life have
39. D.II. (pp. 650 et seq.).

40. Cf. D.III. (pp. 660 et seq.).
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weight and, at least under an improved regulation of counseling,
can, in no event, be refuted as clearly mistaken.
The legislature had in its conception the whole spectrum of
the abortion-problematic in view, especially the large number of
those pregnant women who are susceptible to influence. It must
have proceeded from the idea that women do not normally undergo such an operation with a light heart and without reason.
As a rule, a conflict exists which is to be taken seriously and
which in any case is understandable; the decision to interrupt
pregnancy is made in the "depths of the personality, into which
the summons of penal law does not penetrate. '' 4 1 Exactly in these
cases, according to the view of the legislature, the successful
realization of the counseling system compellingly presupposes
that a simultaneous threat of punishment is ineffective because
women inclined to abortion will not seek out the counseling centers as long as they must fear that by so doing they lose their
freedom of decision and that, by making their pregnancy known,
they expose themselves to criminal prosecution in the event of
a later illegal operation. This view, supported by the judgment
of many experts and corresponding to experience, has been
refuted by neither the petitioners in their oral proceedings nor
by the majority of this Court.
The legislature found itself therefore in the dilemma that
in its judgment preventive counseling and repressive penal sanction are partially exclusive. The legislature's decision to forgo
penal sanctions which could possibly prevent abortions in a probably small number of cases, conceivably to save other life in a
greater number of cases, cannot be dismissed with the comment
that it would be a "lump sum weighing of life against life," which
would be incompatible with the constitutional duty of protection of each individual unborn life. 42 With this argumentation
the majority closes its mind in a manner difficult to understand
to the fact that it is itself doing that for which it reproaches
the legislature. This is so because the majority requires, for its
part, for constitutional reasons an accounting from the legislature by compelling it through a requirement to retain the penal
provision to leave such unborn life without protection, which
could be preserved by the repeal of the penal sanction and
through suitable counseling.
The rigorism of the majority is difficult to reconcile with
the express allowance of a balancing not only of life against life,
but even of life against legal values of a lesser rank in the case
41. Rolinski, Special Committee for Penal Law Reform, Sixth Election Period, 74, 75 and 76th Session, Stenographic Reports, p. 2219.
42. D.II.2.b.-c. (pp. 655 et seq.).

680

The John Marshall Journalof Practiceand Procedure [Vol. 9:605

of indicated abortions. To the extent that state authorized
specialty centers for this balancing must exist, the legislature
must consider it a definite disadvantage of this solution that the
destruction of a child en ventre sa mere is expressly and officially
legitimatized. The majority leaves unanswered the question of
whether in the case of the social indication the examination for
the existence of prerequisites is to be undertaken beforehand by
a specialty center or left to a later criminal proceeding. 43 The
second way would however miss an essential aim of reform,
because it would result in a highly questionable and unjust
insecurity for the affected woman and the participating physicians.
5. Since, after all, each solution remains patchwork from
the viewpoint of protecting life, the legislature may have considered in favor of the term solution further points of view of a
constitutional, hygenic, and criminological-political nature-not
considered by the majority-which supported the term solution.
The legislature could have proceeded from the point of view that
this regulation best respects the personal responsibility of the
woman and mother in a question affecting her life's destiny and
avoids exposing her to the encroachments into the sphere of her
personality connected with a procedure before a specialty center.
The legislature also should have considered that the protection
of developing life goes beyond the physical existence and that
the opportunities in life are better for a child, responsibly
accepted after counseling, than for a child borne only out of fear
of punishment. In essence it could further be that the impairments to health connected with illegal abortions would disappear
and that legal consciousness no longer would be undermined by
an empty threat of punishment or its sporadic application.
Furthermore, it was not clearly erroneous when the legislalature, supported by experiences in foreign countries, saw
an essential disadvantage in the indications solution, in that it
appears as difficult, if not impossible, to find verifiable, uniform
characteristics of demarcation for the social indications which are
relevant only from the viewpoint of reform. 44 The heated controversies in the legislative deliberations have made it obvious
that precisely in this area there exists no consensus about the
limit of the permissible. Presumably the judgment of the
authorities concerning whether the danger of a serious social
emergency exists and whether other measures are to be taken
to avert this danger to the pregnant woman will differ widely
43. C.IA.3. (pp. 647 et seq.).

44. Cf. Printed Materials of the Federal Parliament, 7/1981 (new) p.
12 as well as cited Alternative Draft, loc. cit., p. 27, under A.I.5. (pp.
18 et seq.).
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depending on the region or on the personal attitude of the experts and judges. The result would be a legal uncertainty which
is difficult to tolerate and an inequality for the affected women
and the participating physicians as well as a further slipping into
illegality.
For all these reasons the legislature could risk the attempt
to reform the presently untenable conditions by a counseling and
term solution, even if a safe prediction of further developments
is not possible. Since even the majority correctly proceeds on
the assumption that the well-known statistical data do not permit a safe conclusion 45 in one or the other direction, one need
not go further into the critical utterances against the prognosis
46
of the legislature.
II.

The majority emphatically bases the maintenance of adifferentiated--penal sanction upon the idea that the constitutionally required "condemnation" of unindicated abortions must
be clearly expressed. 47 Insofar as the general preventive effect
of penal law should be discussed, i.e., the endeavor to condemn
an act by inflicting an evil and thereby to influence the actual
behavior of those subject to the law, it has-as discussed-not
been demonstrated that the indications solution guarantees for
its part effective protection of life. It is therefore perhaps no
accident that the majority's argument proceeds in two directions:
it demands, even independently of the desired actual effect, a
condemnation as an expression of a social-ethical negative value
judgment, which clearly characterizes unmotivated abortions as
unjust.
1. It remains undecided how far modern science of penal
law is in accord with such a conception about the function of
penal law and its relationship to ethics4 8 and whether penal law
would not thereby be elevated to an end in itself. Unmotivated
45. D.II.2.c. (pp. 656 et seq.).
46. According to the most recent reports from the German Democratic Republic, which has had the terms solution since 1972, the number
of interruptions of pregnancy in the past two years has reportedly significantly receded. This has resulted from intensive measures by the state
to promote young families and from the development of marital and sexual counseling (cf. Mehlan, The State of Health in Germany 1974, p. 2216
ff.).
47. C.II.3., C.III.2.b., C.III.3., D.II.I., D.II.2., D.III. (pp. 644 et seq., 646

et seq., 647 et seq., 651 et seq., 653 et seq., 660 et seq.).

48. Cf. Baumann, Penal Law, General Part, 6th Ed., 1974, p. 7 f., 27
f., Baumann, The Relationship between Morals and Law, in Morals (edited by Anselm Hertz, 1972) p. 60 ff.; Hanack, Proceedings of the 47th
D.J.T. 1968, Vol. I, p, A 29 ff.; Sax, Principles of the Administration of
Penal Justice, in Bettermann-Nipperdey-Scheuner, The Fundamental
Rights, Vol. 111/2, 1959, p. 930 f., 955 f.; Arthur Kaufmann, Law and
Morals, 1964, p. 42 ff.
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interruptions of pregnancy obviously are ethically objectionable.
With respect to the majority reasoning one questions whether
disregarding of punishment here as elsewhere does not compel
the conclusion that conduct no longer punishable would be
approved. There is especially no place for the legislature to
abolish a penal provision because it, according to the legislative
opinion, is ineffective or even harmful or because the previously
punishable, socially harmful behavior should be dealt with in
another way. Hardly a person will conclude, because of the
repeal or limitation of penal provisions against prostitution,
drug-abuse, adultery or wife-pandering, that the corresponding
acts now enjoy official recognition as legal and moral. The discussions about the reform of §218 of the Penal Code offer no
reason for concluding that the destruction of unborn life was
seriously regarded as a "normal social occurrence."
Insofar as the majority in this connection draws upon the
Statute to Supplement the Penal Law Reform, which has not
been completely dealt with by the legislative bodies, in judging
the counseling and regulation of terms, it is not of consequence
because both statutes are, in their content, 49 independent of one
another, even according to the view of the majority.5 0 Only
if the Statute to Supplement the Penal Law Reform were
enacted would it be proper to examine whether the planned general restitution of costs and continued payment of wages for
abortions not subject to punishment contains an impermissible
state requirement for the cases which are not indicated or
whether this remains to be resolved, for certain important
reasons, perhaps for combating the dangers to health connected
with illegal abortions, which occasioned the Supreme Court even
to forbid punishment constitutionally. 5 ' In the first case this
deficiency within the Statute to Supplement the Penal Law
Reform can be corrected, for example, through the restriction of
restitution of costs to indicated cases, whereby the required examination could also be undertaken even after the interruption of
pregnancy without time pressure. (In this manner, incidentally,
the desired condemnation of unmotivated abortions would be
simultaneously attained.)
2. Our most important objection is directed to the majority's failure to explain how the requirement of condemnation as
an independent duty is constitutionally derived. According to
our view the constitution nowhere requires that ethically objectionable behavior or conduct deserving of punishment must per
49. D.II.l. (pp. 651 et seq.).
50. B.4. (pp. 636 et seq.).
51. 410 U.S. 113 (148 ft., 162 ff.).
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se be condemned with the help of the statutory law without
regard to the desired effect. In a pluralistic, ideologically neutral
and liberal democratic community, it is a task for the forces of
society to codify the postulates of opinion. The state must practice abstention in this matter; its task is the protection of the
legal values guaranteed and recognized by the constitution. For
the constitutional decision it matters only whether the penal provision is imperatively required to secure an effective protection
of developing life, having taken into consideration the interests
of the woman which are deserving of protection.
III.
That the decision of the German legislature for the regulation of terms and counseling neither arises from a fundamental
attitude which is to be morally or legally condemned nor proceeds from apparently false premises in the determination of the
circumstances of life is confirmed by identical or similar provisions for reform in numerous foreign states. In Austria, France,
Denmark, and Sweden an interruption of pregnancy, performed
during the first twelve weeks (in France, ten) of pregnancy by
a physician with the consent of the pregnant woman, is not
punishable; in Great Britain and in the Netherlands a regulation
of indications is in effect which amounts to the same thing in
its practical application. 52 These states can boast that they are
a part of an impressive constitutional tradition and all-in-all
certainly do not lag behind the Federal Republic in unconditional
respect for life of each individual human being; some of them
likewise have historical experience with an inhuman system of
injustice. Their decision required coming to grips with the same
legal and social problems which exist in the Federal Republic.
In all of these countries, the European Human Rights Convention
is legally binding, Article 2, Paragraph 1, of which ("Everyone's
right to life shall be protected by law.") is similar to the constitutional provision of Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the
Basic Law and which as a whole could easily go further than
the domestic German norm. The Constitutional Court of Austria
has expressly determined that the term solution of that country
is compatible with the Human Rights Convention, which in
53
Austria enjoys constitutional rank.
IV.
On the whole therefore, in our opinion, the legislature was
not prevented by the constitution from dispensing with a penal
52. For the United States, cf. A.II.1 (pp. 667 et seq.), with footnote

1 of the dissenting opinion.
53. Loc cit. in II.3.b. of the Reasoning for the Decision, European
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sanction which, according to its unrefuted view, was largely ineffective, inadequate, and even harmful. Its attempt to remedy
through socially adequate means the manifestly developing inability of state and society in the present conditions to serve the
protection of life may be imperfect; it corresponds, however,
more to the spirit of the Basic Law than the demand for punishment and condemnation.
Rupp-von Briinneck

Dr. Simon

Journal for Fundamental Rights, 1975, p. 74 (77f.). Likewise, in France
the Convention enjoys precedence over domestic French Laws, cf. Article
55 of the French Constitution; see also the decision of the Constitutional
Council of January 15, 1975, Official Journal of January 16, 1975, p. 671 European Journal for Fundamental Rights, 1975, p. 54.

